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Following the difficult period of deep recession 
in 2009, the euro-area recovery that set in 
subsequently remains on track. However, growth 
in the coming quarters is expected to not 
accelerate much and is bound to be uneven due 
to divergent adjustment needs of Member States. 
The Commission's spring 2011 forecasts point to 
a likely expansion in euro-area output of 1¾% in 
both 2011 and 2012. The recovery will be 
supported by a progressive broadening of the 
sources of demand. But the ongoing 
deleveraging process in the private and public 
sectors will continue to weigh on spending in the 
short term. Considerable risks surround this 
scenario, not least related to unrest in the Middle 
East and North Africa and its negative impact on 
oil prices, as well as the threat posed by 
sovereign bond market fragility. The 
contributions in this edition of the Quarterly 
Report take a closer look at some of these risks, 
notably regarding the growth impact of oil price 
shocks and the measures taken to address 
country-specific vulnerabilities in a number of 
euro-area Member States.  
Against the background of rising oil prices this 
year caused by supply disruptions and rising 
risks in Middle East and North Africa, one of 
our special topics presents results from oil price 
shock simulations using the Commission's 
QUEST model. These show that the underlying 
causes of oil price shocks matter for economic 
activity. While negative oil supply shocks 
generally cause negative growth effects, oil 
demand shocks (i.e. those due to fast growth in 
the global economy) tend to be less negative for 
GDP growth. At present, both supply disruptions 
and higher world demand for oil appear to be at 
work, so that negative growth effects from 
higher oil prices are at least partly offset by 
strong external demand for euro-area exports. 
The economic outlook is partly shaped by 
adjustment needs to private balance sheets. A 
further contribution in this edition of the 
Quarterly Report therefore reviews the balance 
sheet situation of euro-area households and non-
financial corporations. Since the crisis a notable 
common pattern for both sectors has been their 
shift to a precautionary stance, raising their net 
lending and thereby strengthening their balance 
sheets. Some deleveraging has taken place in the 
corporate sector and both sectors show portfolio 
reallocation towards a less risky asset 
composition. A comparison with the US reveals 
important differences between the two sectors in 
terms of adjustment needs. The euro-area's 
household sector looks comparatively strong 
compared to its US counterpart, whereas the 
reverse is true for the euro-area's corporate 
sector. This suggests that balance sheet 
adjustment is likely to continue in the euro-area 
corporate sector in the short-to-medium term 
while balance-sheet constraints on household 
consumption should be more limited. 
Turning to financial markets, turbulence on 
euro-area sovereign markets has remained high 
in the first half of 2011. Despite the utmost 
resolve of policymakers and a string of 
ambitious and far-reaching policy measures, 
some euro-area sovereigns continue to face acute 
challenges. Greece in particular remains in the 
eye of the storm. It has become clear that the 
path leading to renewed market funding access is 
less smooth than expected at the signing of the 
first financial assistance programme in May 
2010. The fourth joint review mission to Greece 
in May 2011 concluded that, overall, significant 
progress has been achieved during the first year 
of the adjustment program, in particular in the 
area of fiscal consolidation. However, 
reinvigoration of fiscal and broader structural 
reforms is necessary to further reduce the deficit 
and debt and achieve the critical mass of reforms 
needed to improve the business climate and pave 
the way for sustainable economic recovery. 
Efforts to frontload the use of structural funds 
for growth supporting investments and stepped-
up technical assistance are being prepared by the 
Commission to contribute to this process. 
At the European Council summit of 23/24 June 
2011, Heads of State have reiterated that 
everything necessary to ensure the financial 
stability of the euro area will be done and have 
called on Greek authorities to continue 
implementing with resolve the necessary 
adjustment efforts to put the country on a 
sustainable path. On 28/29 June the Greek 
Parliament adopted key laws on fiscal and 
economic reform strategy and privatization in a 
vital step towards long-term reform and 
consolidation. This also safeguards the 
disbursement of the July instalment under 
Greece's first financial assistance programme, 
which the Eurogroup approved on 1 July. 
Furthermore, it lays the foundations for a second 
programme. The European Council has agreed 
an approach for private sector involvement 
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through strictly voluntary rollovers of existing 
Greek debt at maturity, which paves the way for 
Finance Ministers to complete the work on key 
outstanding issues by the end of summer.  
While addressing short-term financing needs in 
some Member States is a top priority, a 
fundamental overhaul of troubled economies is 
also necessary. The structural reforms required 
for this are the subject of a further special topic 
in this edition, which examines the joint EU/IMF 
adjustment programmes in Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. It explains the rationale behind their 
design and reviews their results so far. Ensuring 
rapid fiscal consolidation, raising growth 
potential and at the same time containing risks of 
contagion is crucial in all three countries. 
However, while the three programme countries 
share some common features and challenges, the 
nature of their macroeconomic imbalances are 
highly country-specific. The adjustment 
programmes have therefore been designed so as 
to be both comprehensive and tailor-made to 
country-specific needs.  
While adjustment programmes represent the 
most comprehensive type of integrated 
surveillance, the latter covers all euro-area 
Member States. The first European Semester, 
which was successfully concluded in June, 
embodies the integrated surveillance approach in 
a streamlined sequence of macroeconomic, fiscal 
and structural assessment of Member States by 
the Commission. The June European Council 
endorsed country-specific recommendations in 
these policy areas for each Member State and the 
euro area as a whole. These recommendations 
will help inform and guide national 
policymaking so as to achieve a growth-oriented 
and internally consistent economic strategy for 
the EU. Overarching recommendations have 
further been issued to Member States using the 
euro. 
Against this background, the edition of the 
Quarterly Report at hand takes a closer look at 
some aspects of the new framework for 
integrated surveillance. On the fiscal front, the 
latest vintage of euro-area Member States' 
Stability Programmes show significant, 
frontloaded and mainly expenditure-based fiscal 
consolidation. Although consolidation is 
underway, and the debt path is projected to begin 
declining by 2012, further efforts will be needed 
to address the debt challenge. To achieve the 
2012 public balance targets set out in the 
Stability Programmes, euro-area Member States 
will need to ensure full implementation of 
announced policy measures. Furthermore, 
beyond 2014, additional policy measures will be 
needed to address the costs of population ageing.  
A related topic in this edition examines fiscal 
governance frameworks, i.e. the procedures and 
institutions that underpin the conduct of 
budgetary policymaking. The analysis of 
numerical fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary 
frameworks and independent fiscal institutions 
points towards a trend improvement in fiscal 
frameworks in the euro area since the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, progress seems to have stalled in 
2009 and fiscal governance remains weak in 
some Member States. This assessment highlights 
the need to strengthen fiscal frameworks in the 
euro area.  
Finally, the comprehensive package on the EU's 
crisis response approved by the European 
Council last May has now been almost fully 
implemented. Agreement has been reached on 
the European Stability Mechanism Treaty and on 
the amendment to the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF), which now await 
ratification by Member States. The legislative 
package on economic governance reform, which 
comprises 6 legislative proposals first presented 
by the Commission in September 2010, is 
pending agreement by the Council and the 
European Parliament. Finding agreement on the 
remaining relatively minor issues should be 
treated as a priority, so as to allow for the most 
pressing economic governance needs to be 
addressed without further delay. Once enacted, 
the legislation will address previous 
shortcomings in the areas of fiscal policy 
coordination and establish an effective 
surveillance framework for macroeconomic 
imbalances. It also puts in place appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms and sets minimum 
standards for national fiscal frameworks.  
The crisis has clearly highlighted the need for 
more thorough surveillance and coordination of 
Member States' economic policies at the EU 
level. The comprehensive response to upgrade 
the EU's economic governance framework is a 
key element in this.  
 
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
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1. The Stability Programmes in euro-area Member States  
A key element of integrated policy surveillance in the newly-established European Semester are Member States' 
Stability Programmes, which lay out their planned fiscal developments until 2014. The programmes show a 
significant, frontloaded and mainly expenditure-based consolidation carried out in a realistic scenario of a 
supportive macroeconomic environment. The projected average annual improvement in the structural deficit is 
well above ½ pp of GDP and the debt path is projected to be reversed by 2012. However, although 
consolidation is underway, further efforts will be needed to address the debt challenge. To achieve the 2012 
public balance targets set out in the Stability Programmes, euro-area Member States still have to specify 
additional policy measures, accounting for around ½% of GDP. Furthermore, beyond 2014, additional policy 
measures will be needed to address the costs of population ageing.  
Member States' Stability Programmes foresee 
significant consolidation 
The broad picture of the fiscal developments until 
2014, as projected by euro-area Member States in 
their Stability Programmes (SPs), is one of a 
significant consolidation carried out in a 
supportive macroeconomic environment but of a 
debt challenge still to be addressed. 
Between 2007 and 2009 public finances across the 
euro area were markedly hit by a set of factors 
including the working of automatic stabilisers, 
discretionary measures and a fall in revenues due 
to the burst of housing/credit bubbles in some 
countries. This was followed by a second phase in 
2010 during which the fiscal stance was broadly 
neutral as many Member States continued to 
support their economies with discretionary 
measures while others began a partial withdrawal 
of the stimulus. A phase of consolidation has 
begun in 2011 with a projected significant 
tightening of the fiscal stance. (1) According to 
the Stability Programmes submitted by euro-area 
Member States, the general government deficit is 
projected to shrink from 5.9% of GDP in 2010 to 
1.3% of GDP in 2014 (see Graph 1.1). This 
tightening is projected to take place in line with 
the gradual closure of the output gap by 2014: the 
cyclical improvement of the public balance is thus 
projected to account for 1¾ pp, while the 
structural element accounts for just under 3 pp. 
The government debt path is projected to be 
reversed by 2012 but the decline would occur at a 
very slow pace. Looking beyond the programmes' 
horizon, closing the deficit does not in itself, 
 
(1) For 2011, the Commission forecasts and the Stability 
Programmes projections of the general government deficit are 
equal (4.3% of GDP). This is, however, not the case for 2012, 
as discussed later in this section. 
address the debt problem adequately as the ageing 
issue remains.  
Graph 1.1: Output gap, government debt and 
deficit in SPs, euro area (% of GDP) 
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Source: Commission services, SPs. 
Member States' fiscal projections are based on 
realistic growth assumptions 
Euro-area Member States base their fiscal 
projections for 2011 and 2012 on realistic growth 
assumptions. The Stability Programmes project 
growth to be 1.7% and 1.9% for 2011 and 2012 
respectively. These figures are in line with the 
Commission Spring forecast for 2011 and also 
very close for 2012. The SPs posit a slightly 
stronger cyclical recovery than in the Commission 
forecasts with a slightly faster closure of the 
output gaps (see Graph 1.2). 
In order to generate growth during a time of fiscal 
consolidation, the private and/or the external 
sector must fill the shortfall arising from the 
restraint in the public sector. Graph 1.3 shows that 
all Member States except Malta are showing a 
combination of a tightening in general 
government alongside an expansion in the private 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2011 
sector. (2) In most cases, the private-sector 
expansion is smaller than the contraction in the 
public sector, meaning that an increase in the net 
external position is expected. An improvement in 
the external sector is set to play a significant role 
in Malta, Cyprus, the Netherlands and Slovakia.  
Graph 1.2: GDP growth, potential GDP growth 
and output gap projections, euro area (in %) 
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Source: Commission services, SPs. 
 
For Finland, France and Estonia, the increase in 
demand from the private sector is projected to 
more than make up for the expected decrease in 
the public sector. As a result, these countries are 
projecting a decreasing current account.  
Graph 1.3: Sectoral net lending and relative 
ULC changes (2010–2014), % GDP 
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(1) A position above the dotted 45 degree line signifies that 
increased net lending in the public sector more than offset falls in 
private sector net lending, thus resulting in lower net lending vis-
à-vis the rest of the world.  
Source: Commission services, SPs. 
                                                        
(2) Greece and Portugal have not submitted their Stability 
Programmes and are not included in the analysis. However, 
the euro area average includes figures for Greece and 
Portugal as set out in their economic adjustment programmes 
Consolidation is now underway in the euro 
area as a whole 
Virtually all Member States are anticipating 
consolidation in 2011 and, on average, the plans 
are for significant and frontloaded consolidations. 
With the return of economic growth in 2010 and 
its gradually broadening in 2011 and 2012, the 
consolidation is now underway in the euro area as 
a whole. Graph 1.4 shows Member States' 
planned changes in government deficits over the 
2010–2014 horizon as set out in the SPs. It shows 
that, on aggregate, the euro area is projected to 
improve its fiscal positions every year between 
2010 and 2014. The general government deficit is 
planned to fall from 5.9% of GDP in 2010, to 
4.3% in 2011, 3.1% in 2012, 2.1% in 2013 and 
1.3% in 2014.  
There are, however, variations at Member States 
level in this time profile of improvements. For 
some countries such as Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Estonia, the adjustment is back-
loaded – although in some cases only to a limited 
extent – in the sense that the decrease in both the 
general government deficit and the structural 
deficit is projected to be higher during the second 
half of the timeframe of the programmes (2013–
2014) than during the first half (2011–2012). 
Graph 1.4: Planned changes in government 
deficits over 2010–2014 in the SPs (in pp of GDP)
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A significant tightening of the fiscal stance is 
projected in 2010-2014 in most euro-area Member 
States' SPs. The structural balance is projected to 
improve by 2¾% of GDP whereas the output gap 
improves by around 3% of potential GDP (see 
Graph 1.5). The tightening is particularly strong in 
Spain and Ireland, two countries aiming to ease 
investors' concerns. Conversely, Luxembourg and 
Finland stand out from other euro-area countries 
due to their planned structural loosening.  
- 8 -
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Graph 1.5: Change in the structural balance 
and in the output gap, euro area  
(2010-2014, % of potential GDP) 
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But further measures will be needed to achieve 
the 2012 targets set out in the SPs 
Overall, both the SPs projections and the 
Commission forecasts show a considerable 
reduction in the general government deficit. 
However, for 2012 the SPs deficits are targeted to 
be some 0.4 pp of GDP lower than projected in 
the Commission services' Spring 2011 forecast, 
while debt is projected to be around 1 pp of GDP 
lower. For the euro area, the Commission is 
forecasting a deficit of 3.5% of GDP, while the 
SPs show an expected deficit of 3.1% of GDP. 
The better deficit figures in the SPs partly stem 
from slightly stronger growth forecasts by 
Member States, but are mainly the result of 
additional policy measures included in the SPs but 
not yet specified in sufficient detail ('2012 policy 
gap'). This can be seen in Graph 1.6 which breaks 
down the differences in the deficit projections 
between the Commission forecasts and the SPs in 
3 components: the '2011 base effect' (3), the '2012 
growth gap' (4) and the '2012 policy gap' (5).  
All Member States except Austria, Germany, 
Luxembourg, and Finland are targeting lower 
deficits than the Commission projections for 
2012. In the case of Slovenia and Belgium, the 
SPs project deficits that are over 1 pp lower than 
the Commission's, while Cyprus's SP projects 
deficits more than 2 pp lower. The fact that these 
                                                        
(3) Stems from differences in the growth assumptions for 2011 
and/or from differences in assessing the impact of the 2011 
consolidation measures. 
(4) This effect reflects the difference in the growth assumptions 
in 2012 and is calculated using the standard semi-elasticities 
to estimate the impact of growth on the deficit. 
(5) This effect stems from the difference in the quantification of 
the consolidation measures to be taken for 2012 as the 
Commission forecasts are undertaken on an unchanged policy 
basis, meaning that only measures already specified and 
decided upon are taken into account. 
differences are mainly driven by the policy effect 
shows that Member States will only meet the 
forecasts set out in their SPs if they introduce all 
the measures outlined in their programmes. This 
represents a risk factor as it is unclear how easy it 
will be to introduce these additional policy 
measures. The policy gap is near or above 1pp of 
GDP in the case of Slovenia, Cyprus and 
Belgium, precisely the countries for which SCPs 
and the Commission forecasts differ by at least 
1 pp regarding the deficit for 2012. 
Graph 1.6: General government deficit for 
2012: decomposition of the gap between the SP 
projections and the Commission forecasts  
(in pp of GDP) 
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Source: Commission Services, SPs. 
The projected average structural adjustment is 
mainly expenditure-based and annually well 
above 0.5 pp of GDP 
Graph 1.7 shows the SPs' planned changes in both 
the public expenditure and revenue ratio between 
2010 and 2014, as well as the level of these ratios 
in 2010. Overall, in the euro area, the 
consolidation is due to be primarily expenditure 
based. While revenues are due to increase by 
0.5 pp of GDP between 2010 and 2014, 
expenditures are set to shrink by 3.6 pp. The 
Graph further shows that the overall picture of an 
expenditure-based consolidation holds true for the 
vast majority of Member States. However, a 
number of countries are cutting revenues 
alongside expenditure. For these countries, greater 
cuts in expenditure will be necessary in order to 
ensure that deficits return durably below the 3% 
ceiling specified by the Stability and Growth Pact. 
In the cases of France and (to some extent) 
Belgium, it should be noted that the consolidation 
effort is in part relying on increases in the revenue 
ratio despite the fact that these countries have 
among the highest tax burdens in the euro area. 
Conversely, despite a low starting level, the tax 
- 9 -
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ratio is projected to decrease significantly in 
Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia (6), adding to the 
expenditure cuts that are needed to eliminate the 
deficit. As most of these countries have low 
starting levels of expenditure, there is an added 
risk that it may prove difficult to realise the 
projected expenditure – and thus deficit – cuts. 
is set to fall over the coming decades and the cost 
of providing services for the aged is set to 
increase. In 2060, euro-area age related 
expenditures are expected to be higher than in 
2010 by 6.3 pp of GDP. 
The SPs are ambitious in their plans for the years 
until 2014, but these plans are not going to be the 
end of the effort. In order for debt to fall below 
the 60% of GDP threshold by 2030, yearly 
additional structural improvements of more than 
0.2 pp of GDP would be required from 2015 until 
2020, on average. This assumes that the structural 
primary balance (in % GDP) is kept constant at 
the end-of-programme levels in the SPs, reflecting 
planned changes in fiscal policies as reported in 
the SPs. For some countries, (Ireland, Austria, 
Slovenia and Finland) significantly higher efforts 
will be required. 
Graph 1.7: Planned changes in revenue and 
expenditure over 2010–2014 (pp of GDP) 
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Graph 1.8: Cumulated budgetary effort 
required until 2020 to reach a debt level of 60% 
of GDP by 2030 (pp of GDP) 
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The structural average annual increase between 
2010 and 2014 is well above 0.5 pp. of GDP. An 
improvement of 1 pp. of GDP is pencilled in 
between 2010 and 2011, ¾ pp. between 2011 and 
2012, followed by improvements of ½ pp. While 
countries are moving towards their Medium Term 
Objectives, very few of them are set to achieve 
them by 2014. Only Germany, Italy and Estonia 
are projecting to reach them. 
Consolidation is critical to reverse the debt 
path but also to contain the effects of ageing 
By contrast, the slightly more cautious "2012 
scenario" holds the structural primary balance 
ratio constant at the 2012 level estimated in the 
Commission's Spring 2011 forecasts (reflecting 
the "unchanged policy" assumption). In this 
scenario, the cumulated consolidation effort for 
the euro area is of 4.5 pp of GDP, i.e. just under ½ 
of a percentage point per annum from 2013 until 
2020. 
Consolidation is necessary to overturn the 
additional fiscal pressures brought about by the 
crisis but the long-term pressures caused by an 
ageing population remain. Over the medium and 
long-term, additional policy measures will be 
needed to address the increases in debt that 
population ageing will cause. For example, 
population ageing means that the potential growth  
  
  
  
                                                        
(6) For some of these countries the shrinking tax ratio is mainly 
driven by decelerating EU structural funds absorption over 
the period. Since EU structural funds are deficit-neutral, this 
is mirrored by a decrease of the expenditure ratio. 
Special topics on the euro-area economy 
2. A primer on the EU/IMF adjustment programmes in the euro area  
Overcoming the sovereign debt crisis is a major challenge for the euro area. Unprecedented financial 
assistance programmes have been put in place in some euro-area Member States – Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal – as urgent policy intervention was needed to limit contagion risks in the common interest of all 
Member States. This section provides an overview of the joint EU/IMF adjustment programmes in Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal, explains the rationale behind their design and reviews their results. The programmes 
were designed by the European Commission and IMF, in liaison with the ECB, to address country-specific 
vulnerabilities of the Member States concerned in the structural, fiscal and financial domain. They aim at 
ensuring sound and rapid fiscal consolidation and at raising growth potential while tackling contagion risks. 
Overall, while the programme in Portugal is too recent to have yet yielded substantive results, the programme 
in Ireland is on track with both fiscal consolidation and banking sector recapitalisation well underway. While 
Greece has also delivered a notable fiscal adjustment to date, the overall progress is more complex in light of 
the debt level and the political context. Fiscal and broader structural reforms should be pursued vigorously in 
all three countries. This should allow for further reductions in government deficits and should generate a 
critical mass of reforms needed to improve the business climate and growth prospects, thereby paving the way 
for sustainable economic recovery. 
This section casts a light on the joint EU/IMF 
financial assistance programmes put in place in 
three countries of the euro area — Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal. Its aim is to provide an overview of 
the ongoing programmes by explaining the 
rationale behind their design and reviewing their 
results to date. As the sovereign crises in these 
Member States were caused by country-specific 
factors, the assistance programmes have been 
tailored to country-specific vulnerabilities. This 
section therefore follows a country-by-country 
structure. 
The unfolding of the 2008-09 financial crisis and, 
in its wake, the financial rescue operations, 
stimulus packages and operation of automatic 
stabilisers, have considerably strained public 
finances in all Member States. Pre-existing 
imbalances in terms of public debt have 
worsened. A lasting knock-on effect of the crisis 
is the upward reassessment of risk on all markets. 
Previously overlooked vulnerabilities in Member 
States have been driving sovereign yields and 
CDS spreads up, thus fuelling further the 
deterioration of public finances. Given the 
common currency and deep financial and trade 
integration, the macro-financial stability of both 
the euro-area and EU Member States was at stake. 
Urgent policy intervention was needed to manage 
contagion risks in the common interest of all 
Member States. 
The Balance-of-Payments (BoP) assistance 
activated for Hungary, Romania and Latvia in 
2008-09 in conjunction with the IMF served as a 
basis for the programme design for Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal. Besides their national 
specificities, the three joint EU/IMF conditional 
financial assistance programmes aim at 
safeguarding the integrity of the euro and all 
economies of the euro area in the face of 
unprecedented market turmoil. They address a 
wide range of economic challenges and tackle 
specific national weaknesses as the crises in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal have very different 
root causes. They are articulated around three 
main fronts: financial repair, fiscal consolidation, 
growth and competitiveness. Their policy 
components are described in detail further on. 
In Greece, public debt was on an unsustainable 
path before the crisis and public sector reporting 
was weak, even misleading. Price inflation and 
wage developments were at odds with labour 
market conditions. Thus the adjustment 
programme focuses on regaining competitiveness 
and fiscal health. In Ireland, the crisis was 
induced by the bursting of a property market 
bubble. The oversized banking sector faced large 
losses and its rescue by the government weighed 
heavily on public finances. Hence the programme 
emphases banking sector recapitalisation and 
streamlining of public finances. In Portugal, low 
productivity growth and significant wage 
increases over the last decade undermined the 
country’s competitiveness and its export market 
shares. Public expenditure growth outpaced GDP 
growth, leading to fiscal difficulties. The 
programme therefore focuses on reining in the 
public deficit and debt while enhancing the 
economy's growth potential.  
These three financial assistance programmes are 
prominent parts of a broader euro-area/EU crisis 
 
- 11 -
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Box 2.1: New financial instruments 
In May 2010, the Eurogroup agreed to provide financial assistance for a total amount of € 80 billion to Greece. This 
support is organised through bilateral loans by the participating Member States, pooled by the Commission to 
‘transform’ the bilateral loans into a single loan to Greece. In March 2011 the Euro Area Summit agreed to extend 
the maturity of loans to Greece to 7½ years on average. The shares of participating Member States in the total loan 
are calculated on the basis of the ECB paid capital key. Three euro-area Member States — Ireland, Portugal and 
Slovakia — are currently not participating in the disbursement of bilateral loans to Greece. Slovakia opted for not 
participating, and has been joined by Ireland and later Portugal as these Member States themselves called for 
external financial assistance. 
The May 2010 agreement was followed by a reflection on possible new support mechanisms, and two new 
instruments were devised to cover the financing needs of governments.  
The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) provides for the financing of up to €60bn for the benefit 
of all Member States. (1) It was established in May 2010 by a Council Regulation on the basis of Article 122(2) of 
the Treaty on European Union. The European Commission borrows on behalf of the EU on markets and lends to 
countries.  
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created by the euro-area Member States following the Ecofin 
Council’s decision of 9 May 2010. It borrows on the markets under guarantees by euro-area Member States and on-
lend the proceeds. The Commission and the EFSF coordinate their market activities closely. Euro-area heads of 
government agreed at the Euro Area Summit of March 2011 to raise the EFSF's effective lending capacity to €440bn 
until its expiry in 2013.  
Member States agreed to the creation of a permanent crisis resolution mechanism — the European Stabilisation 
Mechanism (ESM) — in March 2011. Its effective lending capacity will be €500bn and it will be established by an 
international treaty. The ESM will take over the role of the EFSF and the EFSM in providing external financial 
assistance to euro-area Member States after June 2013. (2)  
                                                          
(1) Because of the EFSM’s higher pricing, non-euro area Member States have a greater incentive to use the Balance-of-Payments 
facility. 
(2) However, the EFSF will remain in place after June 2013 to administer the outstanding bonds. It will remain operational until it 
has received full payment of the financing granted to Member States and it has repaid its liabilities. Any undisbursed or 
unfunded portions of existing loan facilities will be transferred to the ESM.  
 
 
resolution package. (7) Overcoming the sovereign 
debt crisis is a major challenge for the euro area. 
The architects of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) had not foreseen the unfolding of events 
that led to soaring sovereign spreads in peripheral 
economies. An underlying pre-crisis tenet of 
EMU was that the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) as well as national self-interest would 
preclude highly vulnerable sovereign debt 
positions, and that there was therefore no need for 
such instruments. Innovative institutional 
solutions therefore had to be found in the face of 
the euro area's sovereign debt crisis. In particular, 
an institutional pre-requisite for the programmes 
was the creation of new financial instruments for 
euro-area countries, which are described in 
Box 2.1.  
Coordination with the IMF 
 
                                                        
(7) For a review of Europe’s comprehensive policy response to 
the crisis see Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 10, 
No 1 (2011). 
EU/IMF joint programmes for Greece, Ireland and 
more recently Portugal have led to an 
unprecedented level of cooperation between the 
two institutions. The programmes were designed 
during joint missions with extensive information 
exchange. The Commission negotiates the 
programme on behalf of Member States and in 
liaison with the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Policy conditionality clauses on fiscal, structural 
and financial aspects are designed in a consistent 
way so as to avoid conflicting objectives. Legal 
documents (Memoranda of Understanding, 
Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies 
and Letters of Intent) are fine-tuned with the IMF 
and the ECB. There is also joint communication, 
with an EU/IMF/ECB press conference at the end 
of the mission and coordinated publications. 
As a rule of thumb — and in line with the 
country’s financing needs and the facilities' 
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lending volume available — the EU provides two 
thirds of the programme funding and the IMF the 
remaining third. Both institutions seek to align 
their lending conditions and instalment schedule. 
Pooling EU and IMF institutional and financial 
resources thus achieves greater financial power 
and more financial stability and credibility. 
Policy conditionality and review missions 
Disbursements are subject to the fulfilment of 
policy conditionality criteria. These are assessed 
during quarterly review missions by the 
Commission in cooperation with the IMF and in 
liaison with the ECB. If targets are missed or are 
expected to be missed, additional action will be 
taken by national authorities to meet the targets 
set in the Memorandum of Understanding.  
A snapshot of programme implementation in 
Greece 
The 2008-09 global crisis exposed Greece’s 
vulnerabilities. Market sentiment vis-à-vis the 
country worsened sharply in early 2010 as the 
downturn took a heavy toll on public finances. 
Significant overspending and a sharp fall in 
government revenue pushed the general 
government deficit to an estimated 13.6 % of GDP 
in 2009. Government debt reached 115 % of GDP 
at the end of 2009. Moreover, the extent of the 
deterioration in the fiscal position was revealed 
with some delay due to serious deficiencies in 
Greece’s accounting and statistical systems. 
Delays in the implementation of corrective 
measures disconcerted financial markets, which 
began questioning Greece's fiscal sustainability. 
Rating agencies downgraded the sovereign, and 
the yield on sovereign bonds and CDS spreads 
increased significantly. 
Following a further worsening of market 
conditions in the course of April 2010, the 
authorities requested bilateral financial assistance 
from euro-area Member States and a Stand-By 
Arrangement from the IMF. On 2 May 2010, the 
Eurogroup agreed to provide bilateral loans 
pooled by the European Commission for a total 
amount of € 80 billion, to be disbursed over the 
period May 2010-June 2013. The financial 
assistance provided by euro-area Member States 
is part of a joint package, with the IMF financing 
an additional € 30 billion under a Stand-By 
Arrangement. This financial assistance package 
was designed to fully cover the government’s 
financing needs related to its fiscal deficit and all 
its maturing medium- and long-term liabilities 
until the beginning of 2012, and progressively less 
thereafter. However, due to the settlement of 
unforeseen arrears accumulated in the past, the 
debt maturing within the programme period has 
increased. The Greek state has also accumulated 
new arrears. As market access remains limited to 
short-term market financing and the regaining of 
long-term market access in early 2012 is now 
unlikely, the programme has become 
underfinanced.  
Euro-area Member States and the IMF have been 
devising solutions to cover the shortfall in 
Greece's revised financing needs, even beyond the 
current program, spanning the period between 
mid-2011 and mid-2014. A revised reform 
package — including an ambitious €50 billion 
privatisation plan — was adopted by the Greek 
Parliament on 29 and 30 June. Against this 
background, and on the basis of the debt 
sustainability analysis by the Commission and the 
IMF, Eurogroup ministers approved the 
disbursement of the fifth tranche of the current 
Greek Loan Facility (amounting to €12 billion, of 
which €8.6 billion from euro-area Member States) 
on 1 July. In addition, private sector involvement 
is being sought through voluntary rollovers of 
maturing Greek debt. All this prepares the ground 
for a second programme, which will be financed 
from both official and private sources, as agreed 
by the June 2011 European Council.  
It should also be noted that, in order to improve 
debt sustainability, the Council decided in March 
2011 to extend the maturities of loans to Greece to 
7.5 years. The interest rate on the EU part of the 
loans is a floating rate based on the 3-month 
Euribor plus a margin of 2 pp until the third 
anniversary of the disbursement, and 3 pp 
thereafter.  
The overarching objective of the programme is to 
durably restore Greece’s credibility for private 
investors by securing fiscal sustainability, 
safeguarding the stability of the financial system, 
and boosting potential growth and 
competitiveness. To this end, the programme 
consists of a comprehensive set of ambitious and 
mutually reinforcing policies, grouped around the 
following three policy areas: 
Fiscal consolidation. Sustainability-enhancing 
fiscal consolidation is urgently needed. The 
immediate priority is to contain the government’s 
financing needs and reassure markets on the 
determination of the authorities to do whatever it 
takes to secure medium- and long-term fiscal 
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Table 2.1: Overview of adjustment programmes in euro-area Member States 
Greece Ireland Portugal
Period covered by EU assistance Assistance available up to June 2013. Assistance available up to December 2013. Assistance available up to June 2014. 
Financial instruments Bilateral loans from euro-area Member 
States
EFSF; EFSM; bilateral loans from the UK, 
Sweden and Denmark , Irish reserves
EFSF; EFSM
Amount granted by the EU Up to € 80 bn Up to € 45 bn Up to € 52 bn
Total size of the assistance (including 
other lenders)
€ 110bn (30 bn from IMF) € 85bn (22.5 bn from IMF) € 78bn (26 bn from IMF)
Number of instalments under EU 
assistance
Up to 12 instalments Up to 12 instalments Up to 12 instalments
Amount disbursed under EU 
assistance so far
€ 38.5bn (4 instalments) € 15bn (2 instalments) € 6.5bn (1 instalment)
Main areas of policy conditionality * Fiscal consolidation * Fiscal consolidation * Fiscal consolidation
* Fiscal governance and reporting 
reform
* Labour market reform * Banking sector recapitalisation and 
deleveraging
* Reform of the public wage system * Public administration and taxation reforms *Prudential Capital Assessment Review
* Pension reform * Energy sector liberalisation * National Recovery Plan to mitigate 
adverse effects on growth
* Financial sector regulation and 
supervision reform 
* Financial sector regulation and 
recapitalisation
* Labour market reform
* Other structural reforms (related to 
Europe 2020 agenda)
* Other structural reforms (related to Europe 
2020 agenda)
* Other structural reforms (related to 
Europe 2020 agenda)
Source: Commission services. 
 
sustainability. The policy programme provides for 
a very large macroeconomic adjustment, 
especially in the public sector. The fiscal deficit is 
projected to be reduced from almost 14 % of GDP 
in 2009 to below 3 % of GDP in 2014. 
Consolidation should rely on measures that 
generate savings in public sector expenditure and 
improve the government’s revenue-raising 
capacity. To this end, an ambitious programme to 
privatise state assets and enterprises has also been 
spelled out. In parallel, measures are needed to 
provide reassurance on the durability of the fiscal 
adjustment, including by specifying and locking 
in consolidation measures for 2011 and 2012, 
reforming the pension system and strengthening 
the fiscal framework. The programme also 
includes associated structural measures, such as 
public administration reforms and measures to 
fight corruption and tax evasion.  
 
Notwithstanding the considerable efforts needed, 
the programme ensures that the burden of the 
adjustment is shared fairly. Policies were designed 
to protect the most vulnerable in society from the 
effects of the economic downturn. By contrast, a 
larger contribution to the consolidation of 
government finances is expected from those who 
have so far not carried their fair share of the tax 
burden. Although public sector wages and 
pensions have been reduced, the programme aims 
to limit the burden on minimum wage earners, 
while preserving an adequate safety net. 
Safeguarding the financial sector. Financial 
sector policies aim to restore confidence and 
ensure the long-run viability of the banking 
sector. This is ensured through short-term bank 
liquidity support, measures to recapitalise banks 
without prejudice to competition rules, and the 
establishment of the Hellenic Financial Stability 
Fund (HFSF). The objective of the Fund is to 
safeguard the stability of the Greek banking 
system. It may provide equity capital to credit 
institutions by acquiring preference shares and, 
under certain conditions, common shares in the 
banks concerned. 
Structural measures. Finally, the structural 
reform agenda prioritises those reforms that have 
a large growth-enhancing or budgetary impact in 
the short-to-medium run. Reforms to tackle 
undeclared work will broaden the scope of the 
formal economy, thereby improving tax 
collection. Unleashing the economy's growth 
potential is the core objective of these structural 
reforms. Labour market reforms will spur job 
creation and increase wage flexibility. Product 
market reforms, not least in the services sector, 
will step up market contestability, reduce the rents 
of vested interest groups and help to curb price 
pressures. Synergies between these measures will 
help to improve the business environment and 
competitiveness of the economy by removing 
rigidities, reducing production costs and 
increasing competition. 
Latest Developments: The fourth Greek review 
mission in May 2011 concluded that while 
significant progress had been achieved during the 
first year of the adjustment programme, there had 
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been implementations problems and the recession 
in 2010 had been more pronounced than 
anticipated. The private sector has shown wage 
moderation and has even registered wage cuts in 
some sectors. Gains in competitiveness have 
supported export growth. However, reinvigoration 
of fiscal and broader structural reforms was 
considered necessary to further reduce the deficit 
and achieve the critical mass of reforms needed to 
improve the business climate and pave the way 
for sustainable economic recovery.  
In the fiscal area, further sustained deficit 
reduction requires comprehensive fiscal structural 
reforms. This strategy includes significant 
downsizing of public sector employment, 
restructuring or closure of public entities, and 
rationalisation in entitlements, while protecting 
vulnerable groups. On the revenue side, the 
government intends to reduce tax exemptions, 
raise property taxation, and step up efforts to fight 
tax evasion. The government is also committed to 
significantly accelerate its privatisation 
programme with the aim of realising revenues of 
€ 50 billion by the end of 2015.  
In the financial sector, liquidity remains tight, but 
policies are in place to ensure adequate liquidity 
provision for the banking system. The banking 
sector remains fundamentally sound and the 
authorities are increasing capital requirements to 
further strengthen capital buffers, giving priority 
to market-based solutions. However, the Financial 
Stability Fund is available as a backstop for viable 
banks that cannot raise capital in the private 
market. 
Further progress has been made with structural 
reforms. Legislation has already been passed or is 
under way to modernise public administration, 
reform healthcare, improve the functioning of the 
labour market, remove barriers to setting up and 
operating a business and liberalise transport and 
energy. The government is committed to continue 
pushing ahead in these areas, with particular 
emphasis on growth drivers.  
Building on the comprehensive policy package, 
discussions on the financing modalities for 
Greece’s economic programme took place in June 
and early July 2011. End June, the Greek 
Parliament adopted a set of key laws on fiscal and 
economic reform strategy and privatization. This 
paved the way for the approval by the Eurogroup 
and the IMF’s Executive Board of the 
disbursement of the July instalment under 
Greece's first financial assistance programme.  
A snapshot of programme implementation in 
Ireland 
From the summer of 2010 onwards, investors 
became increasingly concerned about the Irish 
banking sector and public finances. Banks' losses 
turned out to be much bigger than foreseen earlier. 
This affected the funding of the banks, which 
became increasingly difficult. Also the financing 
costs of the sovereign increased sharply, in part 
owing to the blanket guarantee it had given to the 
banks' financing in 2008. Although the Irish 
authorities implemented measures and announced 
plans with the aim of restoring confidence and 
ensuring funding, these efforts did not succeed in 
improving the financing situation. Banks lost 
access to market funding and corporate deposit 
outflows accelerated, and the cost of government 
borrowing reached unsustainable highs. 
Consequently, the Irish authorities requested 
financial assistance from the EU and IMF on 
21 November 2010 and discussions on the 
programme were finalised during the following 
week. 
A programme of €85bn financial assistance was 
agreed at staff level with the European 
Commission and the IMF, in liaison with the 
ECB, and approved by the Ecofin Council and the 
IMF Board in December 2010. Of the overall 
package, €67.5bn is split equally across the 
following sources (i.e. € 22.5 billion each): (i) the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM), (ii) the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), together with bilateral loans from 
the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden 
(together: €4.8bn), and (iii) the International 
Monetary Fund. In addition to this €67.5bn, 
€17.5bn will be financed by an Irish contribution 
through its treasury cash buffer and investments 
by Ireland’s National Pension Reserve Fund 
(NPRF). The programme provides for up to €50bn 
in fiscal needs and up to €35bn in banking support 
measures between 2011 and the end of 2013. The 
interest rate of the EFSM and EFSF depends on 
the prevailing market rates at the time of each 
drawdown plus a margin. These margins were 
calculated at the beginning of the programme to 
align the EU and the IMF lending rate. Margins 
were set at 292.5 basis points for the EFSM and 
247 basis points for the EFSF. The lending rate of 
the EFSF is further increased by costs of credit 
enhancements. 
The key objective of the programme is to restore 
financial market confidence in the Irish banking 
sector and the sovereign. To achieve this 
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objective, the programme has three key 
components. 
Safeguarding the financial sector. The first aim 
of the programme is a fundamental downsizing 
and reorganisation of the banking sector. 
Addressing market perceptions of weak 
capitalisation, overhauling the banks’ funding 
structure, as well as gradual downsizing and 
deleveraging of the banking system will be 
required. These steps will be backed by the 
availability of programme funds for both 
recapitalisation and deleveraging. 
Fiscal consolidation. Second, the programme 
comprises a strategy to restore fiscal 
sustainability. Building on the authorities’ 
National Recovery Plan, the consolidation 
strategy will rely to a large extent on broad-based 
expenditure restraint. International experience 
shows that this is a typical characteristic of 
successful and sustainable fiscal consolidation 
episodes. At the same time, the tax system will 
undergo profound change. The formerly narrow 
tax base is being broadened with a view to 
enhancing revenue stability and, together with 
increases in specified tax rates, contributing to the 
generation of additional revenue.  
Structural measures. Third, structural reform is 
needed to boost growth. The programme includes 
measures to remove potential structural 
impediments to competitiveness and employment 
creation. Specifically, labour market measures 
should boost employment. Product market 
reforms should include the opening up of 
sheltered service sectors and thus contribute to 
stronger competition and productivity growth. 
Latest developments: The EC/ECB/IMF review 
mission in April 2011 found that the authorities 
adequately complied with the conditionality 
underpinning financial assistance.  
In the banking sector, the comprehensive 
recapitalisation and reforms announced on 
31 March are a major step towards restoring the 
Irish banking system to health. The Central Bank 
of Ireland published the Financial Measures 
Programme (FMP), which presented bank capital 
requirements and deleveraging commitments 
based on the Prudential Capital Assessment 
Review (PCAR) and the Prudential Liquidity 
Assessment Review (PLAR). These exercises 
found that banks need €24bn of fresh capital to 
provide banks with adequate levels of capital to 
cover lifetime losses and to help deleverage the 
banking system to sustainable levels. The banks 
will be recapitalised by 31 July 2011, after 
eliciting contributions from subordinated 
bondholders through liability management 
exercises. The credibility of the exercise has been 
reflected in a positive market reaction, with Irish 
bond yields declining following the 
announcement.   
On the fiscal front, the targets for end-December 
2010 and end-March 2011 were met with a 
comfortable margin. The budget deficit is 
projected at about 10½ percent of GDP in 2011, 
and the authorities reaffirmed their strong 
commitment to the fiscal consolidation agreed in 
the EU/IMF-supported programme, as well as to a 
deficit of 3 percent of GDP in 2015.  
Regarding structural reforms, supportive measures 
in the Jobs Initiative and reform of sectoral wage-
setting arrangements on the basis of an ongoing 
review will foster job creation. The government 
also plans to introduce legislative changes to 
remove restrictions on trade and competition in 
sheltered sectors, including the legal profession, 
medical services and pharmacies. Other measures 
to combat structural unemployment and protect 
vulnerable groups include a temporary reduction 
in the lower rate of social contributions, the 
reallocation of capital expenditure to more labour-
intensive projects and a temporary increase in the 
number of internships and specific skills training 
courses to deal with structural unemployment. In 
addition, the Department of Social Protection will 
draw up a programme of reforms to better target 
social support at those on lower incomes, and 
ensure that work pays for welfare recipients. 
In summary, Ireland is making good progress in 
overcoming the worst economic crisis in its recent 
history. Continued programme implementation, 
with support from the EU and the IMF, remains 
key to ensure Ireland’s return to capital markets at 
affordable interest rates. The successful 
conclusion of the first review has allowed the 
disbursement of € 4.6bn (€ 3.0bn by the EU, and 
€ 1.6bn by the IMF). The next programme review 
mission is scheduled for July 2011. 
A snapshot of programme implementation in 
Portugal  
Unfavourable fiscal developments and a bleak 
outlook for economic growth led to a deterioration 
of confidence and rising pressures in sovereign 
bond markets in early 2011, culminating in 
Portugal's request for official assistance. In 
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parallel, the banking sector, which is heavily 
dependent on external financing, became 
increasingly cut off from market funding and 
resorted extensively to Eurosystem funding. The 
government stepped down after failure to gain 
parliamentary approval for the Stability 
Programme in late March 2011. In the wake of 
consecutive downgrades of Portuguese sovereign 
bonds, interest rates reached levels that were no 
longer compatible with long-term fiscal 
sustainability. 
Following the formal request for financial 
assistance made by the Portuguese authorities on 
7 April, the terms and conditions of the financial 
assistance package were agreed by the Eurogroup 
and the Ecofin Council on 17 May 2011. The 
financial package covers Portugal’s financing 
needs of up to € 78bn. The European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) will 
provide up to €52bn (€26bn from each), to be 
disbursed over three years. Further support will be 
made available by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for up to €26bn under an Extended 
Fund Facility. The EFSM loan will have a 
maximum average maturity of 7.5 years and a 
margin of 215 basis points on top of the EU’s cost 
of funding. For the EFSF, a margin of 208 basis 
points, as well as the costs of its cash buffers, is 
added to the EFSF cost of funding. This yields 
conditions similar to those of the IMF support. 
The aid is being provided on the basis of a three-
year policy programme for the period up to mid-
2014. It includes a banking support scheme of up 
to € 12bn to provide the necessary capital in case 
market solutions cannot be found. 
The programme has received the backing of the 
main political parties and is structured around 
three main areas. First, a credible and balanced 
fiscal consolidation strategy, with the government 
deficit projected at 5.9 % in 2011 and falling to 
3 % of GDP by 2013. Second, deep and 
frontloaded structural reforms, including in the 
labour market and the judicial system. Third, 
efforts to safeguard the financial sector through 
recapitalisation supported by back-up facilities.  
Fiscal consolidation. The fiscal objectives of the 
programme are ambitious but realistic. The 
government deficit is expected to reach 5.9 % of 
GDP in 2011, 4.5 % of GDP in 2012 and 3% in 
2013, in line with the requirements under the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure. Government debt is 
expected to peak at around 108 % in 2013 and 
start declining thereafter.  
Consolidation efforts are frontloaded, broad-based 
and supported by a wide range of measures to 
reduce expenditure and increase revenue. On the 
expenditure side, the measures include wage 
moderation in the public sector, lower transfers to 
local and regional administrations and state-
owned enterprises, pension adjustments and lower 
capital expenditure. On the revenue side, some of 
the measures include broadening the corporate 
and personal income tax bases by reducing tax 
deductions and special regimes, ensuring 
convergence of personal income tax deductions 
applied to pensions and labour income, modifying 
property taxation, broadening the VAT base by 
reducing exemptions and reclassifying goods 
subject to intermediate and reduced rates. 
Fiscal consolidation will be supported by 
supporting measures aimed at strengthening the 
fiscal framework to improve all stages of the 
budgetary process, including monitoring and risk 
management. In addition, Portugal will reap 
efficiency gains from substantial reorganisation of 
its public administration at the national, regional 
and local level.  
Structural measures. Structural reforms cover a 
wide range of areas, including the labour market, 
the housing market, education, energy, transport, 
the business environment, the judicial system, 
services and healthcare. The approach to 
structural reforms is heavily frontloaded. Already 
in 2011, Portugal is expected to implement a first 
batch of measures aimed at strengthening labour 
market functioning by limiting severance 
payments and making working time arrangements 
more flexible. Unemployment benefits will be 
reformed with a view to avoiding unemployment 
traps and increasing the fairness of the system. In 
the energy sector, network industries and services, 
Portugal will adopt measures to promote 
competition and flexibility. The overarching 
objective of these structural reforms is to raise 
potential GDP growth, notably by boosting 
productivity and labour use. Making rapid 
progress towards this goal is key for employment 
and welfare, as well as for long-term fiscal 
sustainability. 
Safeguarding the financial sector. Bank liquidity 
remains tight, even if the Portuguese banking 
system has weathered the crisis relatively well so 
far. On the back of the programme, Banco de 
Portugal is monitoring carefully the liquidity 
situation of the banking system and will intervene 
if necessary. In particular, government-guaranteed 
bonds may be issued up to a maximum of € 35bn. 
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During the programme period, the banking sector 
should adopt a strategy for balanced and orderly 
deleveraging so as to eliminate its funding 
imbalances on a permanent basis. Furthermore, 
the bank solvency support mechanism is endowed 
with resources of up to € 12 billion. At the same 
time, banks are required to further strengthen their 
capital buffers by raising their Tier 1 capital ratio 
to 10 % by the end of 2012. 
Conclusion  
The far-reaching financial assistance programmes 
for Greece, Ireland and Portugal aim to ensure 
sound and rapid fiscal consolidation and increase 
growth potential while limiting contagion risks. 
As such, they are in the common interest of all 
euro-area Member States. In the face of the 
ongoing sovereign debt crisis, joint EU/IMF 
programmes make the most of the European 
Commission’s in-depth knowledge of Member 
States and the institutional set-up of the EU, and 
of the IMF’s long-standing experience in 
international crisis management. This has 
contributed to making joint policy conditionality 
better enforceable. The partnership of the 
Commission, IMF and ECB with the programme 
countries also enhances the programmes’ 
credibility within financial markets and bolsters 
public acceptance. 
Overall, while the programme in Portugal is too 
recent to have yet yielded substantive results, the 
strong political consensus on the program bodes 
well for its implementation. Significant progress 
has been achieved in Ireland, in particular in the 
area of recapitalising and restructuring the 
banking sector and in fiscal consolidation. Ireland 
has also substantially improved its 
competitiveness through wage adjustments.  
While Greece has also delivered a notable fiscal 
adjustment to date, the overall progress is more 
complex in light of the debt level and the political 
context. Reinforcement of the programme is 
therefore needed to ensure Greece's return to a 
sustainable trajectory of public finances.  
Fiscal and broader structural reforms must 
continue to be pursued vigorously in all three 
countries. This should allow further reductions in 
government deficits and should generate the 
critical mass of reforms needed to improve the 
business climate and growth prospects, thereby 
paving the way for sustainable economic 
recovery. 
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3. Private sector balance sheet adjustment in the euro area: how far still to go? 
Inflated balance sheets played a pivotal role in the unravelling of the crisis and the sluggish recovery in the 
euro area partly stems from ongoing deleveraging processes. A detailed examination of latest national account 
data paints a mixed picture of private sector balance sheets in the euro area. Regarding the non-financial 
corporate sector, some progress in balance sheet consolidation has been achieved since the trough of the 
recession in 2009, but further adjustment remains likely in the quarters to come as growth remains subdued 
and debt levels as well as debt-to-equity ratios are still high. Against the background of increased risk aversion 
and corporate operating profits that are still recovering from the crisis, downward pressures from balance 
sheets on the investment recovery are likely to persist for some time.  
By contrast, the situation appears more benign on the household sector's side. Euro-area households have 
adjusted their balance sheets in response to the crisis through higher saving and a portfolio rebalancing 
towards less risky asset holdings. Although housing investment still awaits its revival, households' 
precautionary spending restraint during the crisis seems to have subsided in recent quarters, despite the fact 
that net financial wealth has not yet fully recovered to pre-crisis levels. 
 
Introduction 
Excessive leverage in the private sector, 
particularly in the US and some EU Member 
States, has been one of the root causes of the 
global financial crisis. Changes in lenders' and 
borrowers' assessment of risks and income 
prospects triggered balance sheet consolidation 
processes that have spread well beyond the 
borders of the countries which were the epicentre 
of the crisis. While the balance sheets of the 
public and the banking sector in the euro area 
have been under considerable scrutiny since the 
onset of the crisis, less attention has been devoted 
to developments in the balance sheet of the non-
financial private sector. This section tries to fill 
the gap by reviewing the balance sheet situation 
of euro-area households and non-financial 
corporations as depicted by national accounts. (8)  
 
Operating profits of non-financial corporations 
have been dented by the crisis… 
Euro-area companies' operating profits were hit 
hard by the global economic crisis. Between the 
peak and the trough of the cycle, profitability (as 
measured by the ratio of gross operating surplus 
to value added in the non-financial corporate 
sector) fell by 3.5 pp (Graph 3.1). The reasons for 
this exceptionally sharp drop are well-
documented: the recession was associated with an 
unusually sharp fall in labour productivity due to 
 
                                                        
(8) The sections of euro-area national accounts providing 
financial and income data on individual sectors (households, 
corporations etc..) are published with a lag compared with 
standard GDP data. Consequently, this section will mostly 
draw on information up to 2010Q4.  
a combination of labour hoarding, reduction in 
working time, temporary employment support 
schemes and employment rigidities. As shown in 
Graph 3.2, the deterioration in productivity was 
not matched by sufficient downward wage 
adjustment, so that corporate profits played a 
critical shock absorber role during the recession. 
 
Graph 3.1: Gross operating surplus, euro-area 
non-financial corporations  
(in % of VA, 1999Q1 to 2010Q4) (1) 
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(1) Seasonally adjusted data.  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
The ongoing recovery has led to an improvement 
in profitability due to a sharp rebound in 
productivity, but the rate of profitability at the end 
of 2010 (last available data) remained below the 
levels registered in pre-crisis years.  
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Graph 3.2: Real wage rate and productivity, 
euro area  
(y-o-y changes in %, 1999Q1 to 2011Q1) (1) 
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(1) Seasonally adjusted data. The wage rate is calculated as the 
ratio of employees' compensation to the number of employees. It 
is deflated by the GDP deflator. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
… but the impact was cushioned by low 
interest rates and taxes  
The picture appears more encouraging when 
looking at more broad-based measures of 
corporate profits that account for non-operating 
items. Due to favourable developments in interest 
outlays and taxes, such measures have shown a 
stronger recovery than gross operating surplus, 
with some of them now back at close to pre-crisis 
levels. In particular, net interest payments have 
come down since the early stages of the crisis and 
are now at historical lows. Being large borrowers, 
the easing of overall borrowing conditions over 
the past two years has cushioned the impact of the 
crisis on Euro-area companies' profits. A modest 
reduction in corporate debt (discussed hereafter) 
has also contributed to curb interest payments. 
The impact of the crisis on net profits has also 
been mitigated by developments in taxes and 
fiscal transfers. Since the start of the crisis, 
revenues from corporate income taxes have 
registered a sharp decline due to a shrinking of the 
tax base (profits) and a sharp drop of the 
estimated actual corporate income tax rate 
(Graph 3.3). The estimated actual tax rate on 
corporate income is traditionally influenced by the 
cycle, but in the latest recession discretionary tax 
measures (mostly of a temporary nature) have also 
played a role. (9) So far, the recovery has entailed 
only a modest increase in the estimated actual tax 
rate.  
                                                        
(9) For an analysis of recent tax measures taken in EU Member 
States see: 
European Commission (2011), "Monitoring tax revenues and 
tax reforms in EU Member States 2011", European Economy, 
forthcoming. 
Graph 3.3: Estimated actual corporate income 
tax rate, euro-area non-financial corporations 
(in %, 1999Q4 to 2010Q4) (1) 
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(1) 4 quarter moving average of non-seasonally adjusted data. 
The estimated actual tax rate is calculated as the ratio of tax 
revenues on income and wealth to gross operating surplus. 
Source: Commission services 
Finally, it is also worth stressing that corporations 
have absorbed the impact of the crisis on their 
savings (i.e. the share of profits that is not paid to 
tax authorities, shareholders or creditors but 
retained to acquire physical and financial assets) 
by curbing dividend payments. Although 
distributed profits tend to be strongly cyclical, 
their drop in the latest recession was very sharp 
and their recovery has so far been modest.  
Overall, the picture in terms of profitability 
painted by national accounts at the end of 2010 
appears mixed. Operating profits improved with 
the recovery, albeit from a very low level, and 
non-operating profits have been boosted by 
factors (low interest rates, favourable fiscal 
developments) which are partly temporary. 
Corporations' spending behaviour remains 
cautious  
Whereas euro-area companies have made 
comparatively limited use of job cuts during the 
crisis (at least by historical standards), they have 
resorted extensively to an alternative cyclical 
adjustment variable, namely gross capital 
formation. As shown in Graph 3.4, both gross 
fixed capital formation (i.e. investment) and 
inventories have been curtailed sharply during the 
crisis, with their share in corporate value added 
falling well below the troughs of the downturn of 
the early 2000s.  
Investment and inventories have bottomed out 
since the beginning of the recovery but the 
situation remains mixed, with corporations clearly 
displaying very cautious spending behaviour.  
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First, corporate investment has recovered only 
moderately since the beginning of 2010, 
expanding marginally faster than value added. As 
a result, the ratio of investment to value added 
remains very low. The first release of National 
Accounts for 2011Q1 points to an acceleration of 
total gross capital formation (i.e. including 
corporations but also households and government) 
at the beginning of the year, although the extent of 
the pick-up for corporate investment will only be 
known when the data is available end-July.  
Second, inventories have rebounded more 
noticeably in the recovery, although this pick-up 
only amounts to a slowdown in the rate of de-
stocking. In 2010Q4 (last available data), euro-
area corporations were still depleting their stocks 
at a relatively high rate. Such a pattern is quite 
unusual at this stage of the business cycle. Recent 
analysis carried out on the basis of business 
survey data indicates that the crisis has been 
associated with a shift in enterprises' inventory 
behaviour with rising aversion to the risk of 
holding excessive stocks. (10). Together with 
cautious investment behaviour, this can be 
interpreted as evidence of a persistently high 
degree of risk aversion in the corporate sector. 
Graph 3.4: Investment and inventories, euro-
area non-financial corporations 
(in % of VA, 1999Q1 to 2010Q4) (1) 
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(1) Seasonally adjusted data.  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
High savings and low investment have led to 
large cuts in corporate needs for external funds 
Cuts in capital spending since the beginning of the 
crisis and a strong rebound of corporate savings 
during 2009 have considerably reduced 
corporations' needs for external funds. Typically 
corporations are net borrowers as their funding 
                                                        
(10) See European Commission (2011), European Business Cycle 
Indicators, April, pp. 7-9. 
needs for investment exceed their capacity to 
generate internal funds through retained profits. 
During the recession, however, euro-area firms 
have become net providers of capital to the rest of 
the economy for the first time since the start of 
this series in 1999 (Graph 3.5). In national 
accounting jargon, their Net Lending/Borrowing 
(NLB) has turned positive.  
Graph 3.5: Net lending/borrowing, euro-area 
non-financial corporations  
(% of VA, 1999Q4 to 2010Q4) (1) 
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(1) 4 quarter moving average of non-seasonally adjusted data. 
Net lending is equal to "gross savings" minus "gross capital 
formation" plus "capital transfers" minus "acquisitions less 
disposals of non-financial non-produced assets". 
Source: Eurostat. 
As discussed in a previous issue of this report, a 
sharp and persistent increase in corporate NLB 
can be interpreted as evidence of a process of 
balance sheet adjustment in the corporate 
sector. (11) A positive level of NLB is an 
indication that corporations are accumulating 
internal funds either to acquire foreign assets or to 
reduce debt. The recovery has so far been 
associated with only a modest fall in NLB, which 
remains well above its pre-crisis years and also 
above the peak reached during the previous 
balance sheet consolidation phase of 2002-2004.  
The financial transaction accounts of national 
accounts provide the financial counterpart to 
developments in NLB. A given NLB position 
must be matched by changes in financial assets of 
identical size as shown in the following identity:  
NLB = Δ(Assets) – Δ(Liabilities)  (1) 
where Δ stands for the difference operator. 
The two elements on the right-hand side of the 
equation are plotted in Graph 3.6. During the 
                                                        
(11) See European Commission (2010), "Balance sheet 
adjustment in the corporate sector", Quarterly Report on the 
Euro Area, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp.9-19. 
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crisis, non-financial corporations reduced their 
financial transactions dramatically both on the 
asset side (acquisition of new financial assets) and 
on the liability side (incurrence of new financial 
liabilities). The downward adjustment was, 
however, stronger on the liability side than on the 
asset side. The pace of financial transactions has 
picked up again in the recovery but remains slow.  
Graph 3.6: Financial transactions, euro-area 
non-financial corporations  
(in % of VA, 1999Q4 to 2010Q3)(1) 
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(1) 4 quarter moving average of non-seasonally adjusted data. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 Corporations have started to restructure their 
balance sheets… 
A closer look at the components of financial 
transactions suggests two interesting features of 
the adjustment.  
First, on the asset side, the drop in the pace of 
acquisition is accounted for by more risky assets 
such as equity and financial derivates. This 
suggests a desire to reallocate corporate portfolios 
towards safer assets, a trend which has so far only 
been modestly unwound with the recovery as 
acquisitions of more risky assets have remained 
well below pre-crisis peaks.  
Second, on the liability side, the adjustment has 
mostly taken the form of a sharp drop in the take-
up of new loans at both short and long maturities 
(Graph 3.7). The sharp moderation in borrowing 
via loans has been accompanied by a slight pick-
up in bond issuance, although the latter was far 
too weak to offset the fall in loan-based 
borrowing. Finally, it is worth stressing that data 
on share issuance give no indication that 
corporations have tried to bolster their balance 
sheets by raising equity capital. As a result of the 
crisis, emissions of equity liabilities have fallen 
well below their 2007 peak and have so far shown 
no clear sign of recovery. 
Graph 3.7: Borrowing of euro-area non-
financial corporations  
(% of VA, 1999Q4, 2010Q4) (1) 
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(1) 4 quarter moving average of non-seasonally adjusted data. 
Source: Commission services.  
Companies' efforts to improve their financial 
position have left their mark on balance sheets. 
The share of debt or loans in value added, which 
had been on an strong upward trend during the 
decade preceding the crisis, has been subject to a 
sharp inflection and has come down slightly since 
the start of 2009 (Graph 3.8).  
Graph 3.8: Debt level, euro-area non-financial 
companies (% of VA, 1999Q1 to 2010Q4) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
There is also evidence that some balance sheet 
ratios have improved in recent quarters. On the 
liability side, debt maturity has been extended 
with the share of long-term debt in total debt 
rising (Graph 3.9). On the asset side, the 
proportion of more volatile assets (mostly equity 
and financial derivatives) has come down 
significantly. This partly reflects the sharp falls in 
equity prices brought about by the crisis but also, 
as discussed before, efforts by corporations to 
shed some of these assets, or at least slow the rate 
of their accumulation.  
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Graph 3.9: Balance sheet ratios, euro-area non-
financial corporation  
(in % of VA, 1999Q1 to 2010Q4) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
… but the consolidation process is not over yet 
Some balance sheet indicators, however, sound a 
more cautious note regarding the balance sheet 
outlook. For instance, this is true for the debt-to-
equity ratio. It dropped sharply in the early stages 
of the crisis as equity prices plummeted. Since the 
second quarter of 2009, the combined effects of a 
recovery in share prices and, to a much lesser 
degree, a reduction in the take-up of new loans 
have led to an improvement in the ratio. 
Nevertheless, progress has been slow since the 
early 2010 (reflecting less favourable 
developments in equity prices) and the level of 
debt remains high relative to equity (Graph 3.10).  
Graph 3.10: Debt to equity ratio, euro-area non-
financial corporations  
(in % of VA, 1999Q1 to 2010Q4) 
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Source: Commission services.  
Faced with the prospect of a subdued recovery 
and resulting sluggish profit growth, companies 
are likely to continue to remain financially 
cautious. (12) Corporations are therefore likely to 
take advantage of the recovery by further 
strengthening their balance sheets through 
expenditure restraint. This conclusion is also 
backed by more recent developments in corporate 
credit. According to ECB data, annual growth in 
credit to non-financial corporations has been back 
in positive territory since January 2011 but 
remains weak, with the last reading unchanged at 
0.9% in May 2011. 
Euro-area household sector shifts to 
precautionary saving in crisis  
Since more than a decade the household sector in 
the euro area has shown a rather stable pattern of 
overall saving and investment, and notably more 
so than the corporate sector. Graph 3.11 shows 
that households have consistently been a net 
lender to other sectors of the economy, with 
annual net lending typically showing only 
relatively minor fluctuations outside crisis times. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the financial crisis on 
households' saving and investment behaviour 
stands out. Net lending rose by close to 3 pp. of 
GDP over the course of 2009 before receding 
somewhat in 2010, though ending the year 
distinctly above its long-run average. 
To understand better the drivers of households' 
net lending behaviour, Graph 3.11 also plots the 
gross saving and investment ratios of the euro-
area household sector. Two distinct factors stand 
out: firstly, the gross saving rate rose sharply in 
late 2008 and early 2009, but has since eased 
progressively and is now close to its long-term 
average. This suggests that the crisis brought 
about a temporary surge in precautionary savings, 
a finding that is supported by the sharp coincident 
rise in households' unemployment expectations 
between early 2008 and early 2009. (13)  
Nevertheless, the subsequent normalisation in 
households' spending behaviour suggests that the 
crisis has not had a lasting inhibiting effect on 
consumption spending. Secondly, however, 
households do seem to have scaled back 
investment in a more persistent manner since the 
crisis. This is not least due to the downturn in a 
number of Member States' housing markets and, 
possibly, a tightening of credit conditions. 
                                                        
(12) European Commission (2010) (op. cit.) identifies GDP 
growth and the debt to equity ration as important drivers of 
balance sheet adjustment . 
(13) See the March 2009 results of DG ECFIN's Business and 
Consumer Surveys: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/i
ndex_en.htm 
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Graph 3.11: Household net lending and saving 
and investment rate, euro area (% of gross 
disposable income)(1999Q1-2010Q4)(1) 
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(1) Seasonally adjusted data except net lending, which is a four-
quarter moving average  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Automatic stabilisers prop up household 
income in the face of sharp dividend falls… 
Graph 3.12 presents a decomposition of gross 
disposable income growth over the course of the 
crisis. It shows that households' disposable 
income remained broadly constant in 2009 and 
was thus far less affected by the crisis than GDP. 
The principal reason for this stability lies in the 
functioning of automatic stabilisers, which 
propped up gross disposable income through a 
combination of greater social benefit payments 
and lower overall tax and social contribution 
collections. These are jointly captured in the 'net 
social transfers' aggregate in Graph 3.12. 
Furthermore, as already emphasised, a number of 
factors (e.g. labour hoarding, employment support 
schemes etc.) limited the extent to which total 
employment – and thus labour compensation – 
fell in the euro area during the crisis. 
Graph 3.12: Contributions to annual household 
disposable income growth, euro area  
(in pp, 2008Q1-2010Q4)(1) 
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(1) 4 quarter moving average of non-seasonally adjusted data. 
Source: Commission services 
By contrast, Graph 3.12 shows that a crisis-
induced drop in net property income had a 
strongly negative effect on household income 
growth, and was mostly driven by falling 
dividends. A further negative contribution came 
from falling income associated with households' 
entrepreneurial activities (i.e. gross operating 
surplus and mixed income). Just as for all other 
components, this effect was reversed over the 
course of 2010 and has now begun providing a 
positive stimulus to disposable income growth.  
Crisis impact visible in households' otherwise 
robust balance sheets  
It is instructive to supplement the preceding 
analysis of households' non-financial income 
flows and their use by an examination of 
developments in households' financial balances 
sheets. The two are intrinsically linked, as net 
lending generated by households in a given period 
increases their net claims on other sectors of the 
economy and therefore needs to be matched by an 
improvement in households' net asset position. 
Graph 3.13 presents an overview of the euro-area 
household sector's net asset holdings, revealing a 
consistently positive, though fairly volatile, net 
asset position overall.  
Graph 3.13: Household net asset position by 
asset class, euro area  
(% of gross disposable income, 1999Q1-2010Q3) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Some of the asset classes show a noticeable trend, 
particularly for currency and deposits as well as 
insurance technical reserves on the asset side, and 
for loans on the liabilities side. Bond-type 
securities holdings appear to have been stable 
since 1999 whereas shares and other equity 
constitute by far the most volatile asset class. The 
crisis impact is clearly distinguishable, affecting 
households' overall financial assets – and 
therefore their net financial wealth – as well as a 
number of its main components. 
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Mortgage debt accumulation slows with crisis  
Turning to loans, which constitute the only asset 
class for which the euro area household sector 
shows a net liabilities position, Graph 3.14 depicts 
a secular rise in net long-term loan liabilities, 
mainly accounted for by rising mortgage debt. By 
contrast, the (far smaller) liabilities in short-term 
loans have been more or less unchanged since 
1999. The crisis appears to have slowed the rate at 
which households contracted new long-term loan 
liabilities, as evidenced by a faint kink in the 
graph in mid-2007. 
Graph 3.14: Household loans outstanding,  
euro area  
(% of gross disposable income, 1999Q1-2010Q4) 
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Jan-99 Jul-00 Jan-02 Jul-03 Jan-05 Jul-06 Jan-08 Jul-09
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Long-term (lhs) Short-term (rhs)
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
Graph 3.15: Household net asset position by risk 
category, euro area  
(% of gross disposable income, 1999Q1-2010Q4) 
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On the assets side, Graph 3.15 shows that the 
crisis had a major impact on households' portfolio 
allocation through rising risk aversion. Between 
early 2007 and early 2009, a sharp fall in net 
equity holdings stands out, which has only been 
reversed to a minor extent in subsequent quarters. 
Over the same period, an upward shift in 
relatively low-risk assets such as currency and 
deposits is noticeable, pointing to a qualitative 
strengthening of households' financial position. 
Household's net wealth driven by equity prices 
Global equity price movements during the crisis 
clearly played a major part in the fall of 
households' net financial wealth during the crisis. 
To illustrate this link better, Graph 3.16 maps the 
valuation effects of price (and potentially 
currency) movements on households' net equity 
holdings and their total net asset position. It shows 
that the two are closely linked, with valuation 
effects for total asset holdings even slightly 
stronger than the equity-related ones. Since 1999, 
valuation effects have tended to be negative for 
households' financial long-term wealth overall. 
Finally, the equities crash in 2008 broadly 
matches the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 
2001 in terms of its damaging effect on household 
wealth, although the latter partly resulted from a 
much sharper pre-crash rally.  
Graph 3.16: Valuation effects in quarterly 
movements in households' net asset position, euro 
area (% gross disposable income, 1999Q1-
2010Q4) (1) 
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(1) 4 quarter moving average of non-seasonally adjusted data. 
Source: Commission services. 
The magnitude of the above valuation effects 
stemming from equity prices is a striking 
illustration of the fact that higher leverage entails 
greater total value at risk, as the overall impact of 
a given price change rises with the underlying 
asset stock size. Graph 3.17 shows that during the 
crisis the quarterly change in households' net 
equity wealth was by far dominated by price 
swings, whereas actual transactions in or out of 
equity markets played only a very minor role in 
driving equity holdings. This illustrates an 
important point related to balance sheet 
adjustment process. Consolidation efforts that aim 
to improve net wealth through greater net saving 
can easily be drowned out by price swings, 
especially if there are mismatches in terms of 
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asset types and currency denomination between 
the asset and liabilities side of the balance sheet. 
In contrast, the situation appears more benign on 
households' side. Euro-area households have 
adjusted their spending, saving and investment 
behaviour in a pro-cyclical manner during the 
crisis, i.e. switching to a more precautionary 
stance. The resulting increase in net lending was, 
however, much smaller for households than for 
corporations. Furthermore, the rise in 
precautionary savings during the crisis has since 
been progressively unwound suggesting a more 
benign assessment of risks, probably supported by 
the relative stability of households' disposable 
income during the crisis. As in the case of 
corporations, households' balance sheets show a 
rebalancing towards low-risk assets. On the 
liabilities side an inflection in the pace of debt 
accumulation is visible but deleveraging has been 
less pronounced than for corporations. Although 
housing investment still awaits a revival, 
pressures from balance sheets on household 
consumption seem to have subsided in recent 
quarters despite the fact that net financial wealth 
has been deeply affected by falls in equity prices 
and has not yet fully recovered to pre-crisis levels.  
Graph 3.17: Contributions to quarterly changes 
in households' holdings of equity assets, euro 
area (pp of gross disposable income, 2007Q4-
2010Q4) 
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Overall assessment: contrasting picture for 
corporations and households 
Overall, the analysis presented in this section 
suggests contrasting positions for corporate and 
household balance sheets in the euro area. As to 
the non-financial corporate sector, some progress 
in balance sheet consolidation has been achieved 
since the trough of the crisis but further 
adjustment in the quarters to come remains likely, 
as growth remains subdued and debt levels as well 
as debt to equity ratio are still high. Against the 
background of increased risk aversion and 
corporate operating profits that are still recovering 
from the crisis, downward pressures from balance 
sheets on the investment recovery are likely to 
persist for some time.  
Finally, it is worth stressing that the situation in 
the euro area contrasts sharply with the US. Euro-
area corporations entered the crisis with a much 
higher level of debt than their US counterparts 
and have since experienced a period of 
deleveraging, whereas debt accumulation has 
been little affected by the crisis in the US. By 
contrast, euro-area household are much less 
indebted then their US counterparts. As a result, 
the crisis has only led to a minor slowing in the 
pace of new borrowing in the euro area, whereas 
US households have embarked on a clear 
deleveraging process.  
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4. Fiscal governance in euro-area Member States: insights from a fiscal governance 
database 
Fiscal governance frameworks comprise the procedures and institutions that underlie the conduct of budgetary 
policies. Fiscal governance at national level has been gaining increased relevance recently, as reflected not 
least in the Commission's legislative proposals to enhance economic governance currently under negotiation. 
Based on an Ecofin Council mandate, the Commission services maintain a database on fiscal governance in 
EU Member States, focusing on three key dimensions: numerical fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary 
frameworks, and independent fiscal institutions. The data show that fiscal governance remains weak along the 
three dimensions in some Member States. Furthermore, the trend towards an increasing number of fiscal rules 
was reversed in 2009 (latest data available), with this fall being the first since 1990 and the average strength of 
such rules decreasing as well. In 2009, 16 euro-area Member States had a medium-term budgetary framework, 
although in many cases such frameworks showed considerable flaws. 21 independent fiscal institutions were 
operating in euro-area Members States in 2009. While the fiscal governance database captures the 
heterogeneity across euro area members, it also highlights that some Member States still have some way to go 
to reach the standards laid down in the draft Directive on budgetary frameworks of EU member states, which 
formulates the ‘least common denominator’ required for SGP compliance.  
 
Introduction 
Fiscal governance frameworks comprise the 
procedures and institutions that underpin all 
stages of the conduct of budgetary policies of 
general government (planning, approval, 
implementation, monitoring). A growing body of 
empirical research shows that well-designed fiscal 
governance frameworks can contribute to 
attaining sound budgetary positions, reducing the 
cyclicality of fiscal policymaking, and improving 
the efficiency of public spending, inter alia by 
placing constraints on time-inconsistent behaviour 
of policymakers and by forcing them to adopt a 
longer-term approach to fiscal policy making.  
In recognition of this empirical evidence, national 
fiscal governance has gained increasing 
importance in the EU’s policy framework. In 
recent years, the Ecofin Council has on several 
occasions reiterated the importance of national 
budgetary frameworks for the soundness of public 
finances. (14) In January 2006, the Ecofin Council 
asked the Commission to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of existing national fiscal 
rules and institutions in the EU Member States 
and their influence on budgetary developments. In 
April 2009, the Ecofin Council invited Member 
States to annually update the Commission’s 
database on fiscal governance. One year later, it 
launched the regular assessment of national fiscal 
governance frameworks. (15) In addition to this 
evaluation of national fiscal governance 
 
                                                        
                                                       
(14) See the Ecofin Council conclusions of October 2006, October 
2007 and May 2008. 
(15) This peer review is conducted in the Economic Policy 
Committee; the first review round took place in May 2011. 
frameworks against non-binding standards of best 
practice, the Commission is proposing a number 
of binding minimum requirements for fiscal 
governance in EU countries in the draft Council 
Regulation on requirements for Member States’ 
budgetary frameworks. This was tabled by the 
Commission in September 2010 and is currently 
under discussion between the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Commission 
(together with five other legislative proposals on 
economic governance). (16) 
Following the 2006 Ecofin Council mandate, the 
Commission services have built up a database on 
fiscal governance in the euro-area Member States 
that is updated annually. This unique database 
focuses on three specific areas: national fiscal 
rules, medium-term budgetary frameworks, and 
independent fiscal institutions. (17) The present 
section provides an overview of fiscal governance 
in the euro-area Member States in these three 
areas. It is based on the latest update of the 
dataset, reflecting the situation as of 2009. 
Naturally, owing to the design of data collection, 
this overview cannot do full justice to all facets of 
national fiscal governance, and in particular recent 
changes in the countries reviewed.  
 
(16) For an overview of these legislative proposals see European 
Commission (2010), Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, 
Vol. 9, No 3. 
(17) The fiscal governance dataset is available on DG ECFIN’s 
website at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_go
vernance/index_en.htm.   
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Numerical fiscal rules 
The Commission’s fiscal governance dataset 
covers numerical fiscal rules (18) that target the 
main budgetary aggregates (i.e. budget balance, 
government expenditure and revenues, 
government debt or a major component thereof) in 
all sectors of government (central, regional, and 
local; general government; and social security). 
Procedural rules on the preparation of the annual 
budget are not considered.  
Euro-area Member States had 42 numerical fiscal 
rules in place in 2009. Of these rules, which were 
in force across all euro-area members except 
Greece, Cyprus and Malta, budget balance rules 
were most widespread, with 18 such rules (42 %). 
They provide some form of ceiling for the budget 
balance (typically the deficit), e.g as per cent of 
GDP, or in absolute real or nominal terms, and 
often applying to the structural balance only. At 
the same time, euro-area Member States operated 
11 expenditure rules and 9 debt rules, while there 
were 3 revenue rules and one combined rule 
constraining the budget balance and expenditure. 
Expenditure and debt rules also impose a ceiling 
on the respective budgetary aggregates, whereas 
revenue rules typically govern the allocation of 
unexpected revenues. Typically, a majority of 
budget balance rules (7) and debt rules (4) applied 
to local government, while expenditure rules were 
mostly in place for central government (5 such 
rules).  
Graph 4.1: Number of fiscal rules in euro-area 
Member States by type (1990-2009) 
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2009 was the first year in the past two decades to 
witness a decline in the number of numerical 
                                                        
(18) The survey adopts the definition of Kopits and Symanski 
(1998) whereby a fiscal rule is ‘a permanent constraint on 
fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of 
fiscal performance’. See Kopits, G. and S. Symanski (1998), 
‘Fiscal policy rules’, IMF Occasional Paper, No 162. 
fiscal rules in force (Graph 4.1). (19) Compared 
with 2008, three rules were abolished or put in 
abeyance (a budget balance rule in Finland and an 
expenditure rule and a debt rule in Slovakia). At 
the same time, Austria replaced a budget balance 
rule for all sectors of government except social 
security with an expenditure rule for general 
government. 
The Commission services have devised a 
composite index measuring the strength of 
numerical fiscal rules based on five criteria: their 
statutory basis, the room for setting or revising 
objectives, the nature of the body in charge of 
monitoring whether the rule is complied with, 
enforcement mechanisms, and media visibility. 
The index also takes into account the coverage of 
general government. (20) In 2009, this fiscal rule 
index fell for the first time since 1990 for the 
euro-area average (see Graph 4.2). (21) This 
resulted from the decrease in the number of 
numerical fiscal rules together with the 
replacement of a rule with broader coverage by 
one applying to a smaller share of general 
government finance (Austria, as described above). 
Graph 4.2: The Fiscal Rule Index in the euro 
area and other selected aggregates (1999 to 2009) 
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
EU-27 EA-16
EU-15 EU-12
(1) The fiscal rule index is calculated by assessing five criteria 
(see text). The index is standardised so that the average over the 
1999-2009 sample is 0 and the standard deviation 1. 
Source: Commission services. 
Medium-term budgetary frameworks 
Medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs) 
comprise the procedures for preparing, 
implementing and monitoring multi-annual 
budget plans. They improve the quality of fiscal 
policy making, as the implications of most fiscal 
                                                        
(19) The dataset contains retrospective information back to 1990. 
(20) More information on the fiscal rule index can be found on 
DG ECFIN’s fiscal governance website. 
(21) The weakening of the average strength of fiscal rules also 
applied to the EU-27 average, as well as the pre-2004 
Member States (EU-15) and the new entrants (EU-12). 
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policy measures go well beyond the yearly budget 
cycle. In 2009, all euro-area Member States but 
four (CY, EL, LU, PT) had national MTBFs in 
addition to their Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCPs). (22) Most cover the whole of 
general government or large parts, typically with a 
three-year horizon — although the most 
developed MTBFs cover four (FI, AT) or five 
years (NL). In most MTBFs, the planning horizon 
is moved forward annually by a year, allowing 
earlier years’ plans to be revised (rolling and 
flexible MTBFs). The main new development in 
Member States’ MTBFs in 2009 was the 
introduction of the four-year expenditure 
framework in Austria.  
Graph 4.3: The Medium Term Budgetary 
Framework Index in the euro area (2009) 
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From the survey information on MTBFs a 
composite index of their quality has been 
constructed on the basis of five criteria: (1) the 
existence of a domestic MTBF (beyond the 
requirements of the SCPs), (2) the link between 
the multi-annual budgetary targets and the 
preparation of the annual budget, (3) the 
involvement of national parliaments in the 
preparation of the medium-term budgetary plans, 
(4) the existence of coordination mechanisms 
between sectors of general government prior to 
setting the medium-term budgetary targets, and 
(5) the mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing 
multi-annual budgetary targets. Graph 4.3 shows 
the ranking of the euro-area Member States by 
this measure of MTBF quality. According to the 
MTBF index, four groups can be distinguished: 
the MTBFs of AT, ES, FI, FR, NL are most 
developed. IT, MT, BE, DE and SI have MTBFs 
of average quality, while in IE and SK there is 
scope for considerable improvement. Finally, CY, 
EL, LU and PT lack procedures for medium-term 
                                                        
                                                       
(22) Details on the MTBF index can be found on DG ECFIN’s 
fiscal governance website. 
budgetary planning beyond those directly serving 
the European surveillance framework. In general, 
weaknesses relate to the lack of detail of 
budgetary projections, scant monitoring, the 
absence of correction mechanisms, and poor 
coordination of sub-levels of government.  
Independent fiscal institutions  
Independent fiscal institutions are a further 
institutional mechanism to improve budgetary 
performance by providing independent input 
(such as macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts), 
positive or normative analysis, assessment, and 
recommendations on fiscal policy making. The 
fiscal governance database includes institutions 
that are primarily financed by public funds but are 
functionally independent from fiscal 
authorities. (23) In 2009, there were 21 such 
institutions located in 11 euro-area Member States 
(CY, FI, IE, MT, SK had no such institution). 
Typically, these institutions were far more 
common in the pre-2004 EU Member States, 
often with a long history, also due to the 
requirements of such institutions in terms of 
human resources, where smaller countries might 
have staffing difficulties.  
In 2009, seven euro-area Member States had 
independent fiscal institutions mandated to 
monitor budget performance (BE, DE, ES, FR, IT, 
NL, PT). In four euro-area Member States, such 
institutions were providing budgetary forecasts 
(AT, BE, NL, SI) and non-binding 
macroeconomic forecasts (DE, FR, EL, LU). A 
notable development in 2009 was the 
establishment of a new independent fiscal 
institution in Slovenia, where one such institution, 
IMAD, had been operating already, being 
entrusted with evaluating the quality of public 
finances. The new council established in June 
2009 has been assigned a consultative role in the 
area of fiscal policy and the implementation of 
 
(23) Independent fiscal institutions (also called fiscal councils) are 
non-partisan public bodies other than the central bank, 
government or parliament that prepare macroeconomic 
forecasts for the budget, monitor fiscal performance and/or 
advise the government on fiscal policy matters. Specifically, 
they may provide macroeconomic forecasts for the budget 
preparation that do not suffer from optimistic bias; they may 
impartially monitor the implementation of budget plans and 
adherence to budgetary objectives; they may raise awareness 
of the short- and long-term costs and benefits of budgetary 
measures; and they may assess whether fiscal measures are 
appropriate in terms of compliance with rules, stability, and 
sustainability. Courts of Auditors are included if their 
activities go beyond accounting control and cover any of the 
tasks mentioned above. Think tanks, Central banks and 
directorates of ministries of finance are not considered. 
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Box 4.1: Examples of national fiscal frameworks: Belgium and Austria
In Belgium, high deficit and debt levels in the late 1980s and the launch of EMU in the 1990s prompted the 
authorities to reinforce the institutional setting to fiscal policy making. The resulting institutional reform was centred 
around two independent fiscal institutions: the National Account Institute (NAI) was established in 1994 and was 
entrusted with providing macroeconomic forecasts for budget preparation, while the reformed High Council of 
Finance has been responsible for monitoring fiscal policy and formulating medium-term objectives at the regional 
level since 1992. As part of the reform, the existing rules-based fiscal governance framework was reinforced as well. 
On top of the budget balance rule for local governments, five new numerical rules were implemented throughout the 
1990s: an expenditure rule and a revenue rule respectively for central government, a budget balance rule and an 
expenditure rule for social security, and a budget balance rule for regional governments. The resulting coverage of 
all general government by numerical fiscal rules was complemented by reinforced multiannual fiscal planning in 
order to foster consolidation and accede to EMU. Due to the high level of fiscal decentralisation in Belgium, co-
ordination between different levels of government is crucial. A key role in co-ordination is assumed by the HCF, 
which issues recommendations on general government budget balances for the years ahead. These recommendations 
provide the basis for political agreements between the federal and regional governments that include medium-term 
budgetary targets and act as internal stability programmes. Enforcement of these programmes is ensured by 
restrictions on debt issuance in the event of non-compliance. Important elements of the fiscal governance framework 
are budgetary targets (mainly expenditure ceilings) to centralise the budget preparation, which in turn are backed by 
a multi-annual fiscal programme as part of the coalition contract among the ruling parties. Finally, the Minister of 
Finance has strong powers to monitor budgetary implementation, but has limited agenda-setting powers.  
In Austria, the main elements of the fiscal governance framework are the Austrian Stability Pact (ASP), which 
covers all levels of government, and the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, which applies to the federal 
government. The ASP was first set up in 1996 to foster consolidation and fiscal discipline, as required under EMU. 
In 1999, the ASP was formalised; successors were adopted for 2001 to 2004, 2005 to 2008, and 2008 to 2013. The 
Pact was complemented by a consultation mechanism between levels of government to prevent legislation resulting 
in financial strain on other levels of government. The ASP sets deficit/surplus targets for the federal, regional and 
local governments, supported by a sanctioning mechanism. Initially, budgetary surpluses were not supposed to be 
carried over to future years. But because of the resulting pro-cyclicality such carry-over has been admitted, so that 
averages over the duration of the Pact are assessed instead. The ASP also includes sanctions that take the form of 
interest-bearing deposits that are distributed among compliant governments if targets are not reached in the 
following year. The sanction has not been used so far, however. A further important element of the Austrian fiscal 
governance framework is the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), introduced in 2009. It requires 
Parliament to adopt 4-year plans for nominal expenditure limits under five budgetary headings; these plans are 
annually rolled forward by one year. Expenditure ceilings are divided into fixed (about 80%) and flexible ones (for 
the remaining 20%); the latter cover areas that are subject to large cyclical fluctuations. Expenditure ceilings are also 
specified at the sub-heading level; they are binding for the following year and indicative for the three years 
thereafter. Line ministries can build reserves from unspent appropriations at the end of the year. Further reform 
initiated is expected to come into force in 2013, including performance budgeting, results-oriented management of 
administrative units, and a modernisation of the accounting system. Austria’s fiscal governance framework is 
complemented by the operation of two independent fiscal institutions: the budget law is prepared using economic 
projections provided by the Austrian Institute for Economic Research (WIFO), while the Government Debt 
Committee (Staatsschuldenausschuss) provides fiscal analysis and consolidation recommendations.  
 
 
 
structural reforms. It is authorised to evaluate 
fiscal policies in terms of sustainability and 
appropriateness under the given cyclical 
conditions, compliance with national and 
European fiscal rules, and the quality of public 
finance. 
Conclusion 
The trend towards an increasing number of fiscal 
rules in the euro area was reversed in 2009. Of the 
45 numerical fiscal rules in force in 2008, three 
were subsequently abolished, ostensibly due to 
their unsuitability to accommodate the fiscal 
policy challenges posed by the crisis. 
Consequently, the average strength of numerical 
fiscal rules also dropped by around one third 
against the previous year. Concerning medium-
term budgetary frameworks, a novel development 
in 2009 was the establishment of a four-year 
expenditure framework in Austria. In 2009, three 
quarters of euro-area Member States had a 
medium-term budgetary framework that exceeded 
the SCP requirements, but in some cases, these 
frameworks displayed serious flaws such as 
insufficient coordination across sub-sectors of 
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general government and the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms; no change was registered along 
these lines in 2009. Finally, as regards 
independent fiscal institutions, the euro area saw 
the creation of a new body of this nature in 2009. 
Specifically, with the new Fiscal Council in 
Slovenia, the number of such institutions 
operating in 11 of the euro-area Member States 
increased to 21. 
The above snapshot of fiscal governance in euro-
area Member States relies on data as of 2009 and 
may therefore not correspond to the present 
situation in some cases. Besides, the dataset 
focuses on specific aspects of fiscal frameworks, 
which cannot fully reflect all the details of 
Member States’ fiscal governance. Unfortunately, 
however, the quality of fiscal governance in the 
different areas portrayed above — numerical  
fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary frameworks, 
and independent fiscal institutions — tends to 
correlate, so that strengths and weaknesses in 
these areas reinforce each other, leaving a group 
of euro-area Member States with weak fiscal 
governance altogether. It can be conjectured that 
the quality of other characteristics of fiscal 
governance not discussed above, such as 
budgetary procedures other than those related to 
medium-term planning, also depends on to the 
quality of the elements described here, 
underlining the need for improvement in the 
weakest euro-area Member States. This 
conclusion gains further support from the 
requirements spelled out in the draft Directive on 
EU budgetary frameworks, which specifies a 
minimum standard for fiscal governance in EU 
Member States in order to foster compliance with 
the SGP. 
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5. The impact of an increase in oil prices on economic activity 
The price of oil has risen in the recent year due to more optimistic growth expectations for emerging economies 
and on the back of supply risks and disruptions in the Middle East and North Africa. Against this background, 
Section 5 presents model scenarios of endogenously driven oil price shocks using a recently constructed 
disaggregated version of the Commission's QUEST model. These simulations show that a proper assessment of 
the economic effect of a rise in oil prices requires a good understanding of the underlying causes of these price 
changes. Oil supply shocks generally have negative growth effects, raising costs in particular in energy 
intensive sectors and this spilling over to the whole economy. Oil demand shocks (i.e. those due to fast growth 
in the global economy) on the other hand lead to gradual but more persistent increases in the price of oil. This 
also has a negative impact on growth but the stimulus from higher global demand to exports can initially 
outweigh the negative impact from higher energy costs and the net effect on output can be positive. While these 
scenarios show the differences between supply and demand driven oil price shocks are significant, it is always 
difficult to disentangle the causes of changes in the price of crude oil in real time. At present, a combination of 
factors, i.e. supply disruptions as well as higher world demand for oil, are most likely playing a role, 
suggesting that the overall impact on growth should remain limited. 
Given the expected sluggishness of the euro area's 
economic recovery, the evolution of oil prices 
forms a major concern. Oil is the most important 
source of energy and its price determines to a 
large extent other energy prices. Renewed 
increases in oil prices constitute a major downside 
risk to growth and an upside risk to inflation. 
Large oil price changes have been the driving 
force behind major recessions in recent history, 
and according to some also played a key role in 
the recent recession. (24) But what is of crucial 
importance is the underlying cause of oil price 
changes. Supply-driven oil price shocks have real 
effects that differ from those of oil price increases 
stemming from higher global demand. Against 
this background, this article presents model 
scenarios of endogenously driven oil price shocks 
using a disaggregated version of the 
Commission’s QUEST model. It finds that in 
contrast to supply-driven oil price shocks, which 
have generally negative growth effects, the 
macroeconomic impact of oil price changes 
associated with higher global demand could be 
less adverse. 
Oil price developments 
 
                                                       
Historically, oil price shocks have primarily been 
caused by physical disruptions in the supply of 
oil. This holds particularly for the shocks in the 
1970s, which were associated with significant 
reductions in OPEC’s oil supply. Following these 
price hikes, higher energy costs provided an 
incentive to reduce oil dependency and raise 
                                                        
(24) Hamilton (2009) argues that the 2007-08 oil price shock was 
a major factor in causing the current recession and its impact 
was magnified by the rising energy share in expenditure. 
Hamilton, J. (2009), ‘Causes and consequences of the oil 
shock of 2007-08’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
Vol. 40(1), pp. 215-83. 
investment in energy-saving technologies. They 
also made other sources of energy more 
profitable, and led to an increase in supply. As a 
result, oil prices were in a general decline in the 
following two decades. However, faster growth in 
emerging economies in the 2000s raised demand 
for oil (and other commodities) and led to a surge 
in oil prices. The price of oil has risen sharply 
over the last decade and reached historic heights 
in the summer of 2008, peaking at USD 145 per 
barrel. With the onset of the crisis and the sharp 
decline in global economic activity, oil prices 
collapsed and fell back to below USD 40 per 
barrel by the end of 2008 (Graph 5.1). However, 
since then, global oil markets have started to 
tighten again, as demand growth has outstripped 
supply. More optimistic growth expectations for 
emerging economies have led to a rebound in the 
price of oil. In 2011, the oil price has risen further 
on the back of supply risks and disruptions in the 
Middle East and North Africa. Following the loss 
of 1.3 mb/d of Libyan exports, spare capacity has 
fallen to its lowest level since late 2008, although 
this loss has been partly offset by increased 
production by other OPEC members such as 
Saudi Arabia. In addition to tight fundamentals, 
markets have concerns over unrest spreading to 
other regional producers, which has triggered a 
‘geopolitical’ risk premium. The price of crude oil 
has hovered around USD 110-120 per barrel 
(EUR 80 per barrel) in recent months, and there 
remain widespread concerns about future price 
developments. (25) 
 
(25) The IMF (2011) analyses the long-term implications of oil 
scarcity, caused by unresolved tensions between expected 
rapid growth in oil demand in emerging markets and the 
downward shift in oil supply trends. IMF (2011), ‘Oil 
scarcity, growth and global imbalances’, World Economic 
Outlook, Chapter 3 (April).  
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Box 5.1: A DSGE model with energy sectors
The QUEST model with energy sectors is a multi-sector version of DG ECFIN’s standard open economy DSGE 
model. The model consists of three regions, the European Union (EU-27), the group of fossil fuel exporting 
countries (OEX) and the rest of the world (R). In each region, the model economy is populated by liquidity-
constrained and non-constrained households, five sectors of producing firms, a monetary and a fiscal authority. We 
distinguish two sectors of non-energy goods and services and three energy-related sectors. Each firm in each sector 
produces differentiated goods which are imperfect substitutes for domestic and foreign goods. Firms use a capital 
and labour composite (value added VA) and a material and energy composite of intermediate goods (M). Interest 
rates are endogenous and the monetary authorities follow a standard Taylor rule in each region. The fiscal authority 
receives its revenue from taxes on factor incomes and consumption. The consumption, labour supply, fiscal and 
monetary authority settings closely follow those of the standard QUEST3 model (see Roeger et al., 2009 (1)), so we 
focus on the main difference, which is the production structure in a multi-sector setting (see also Conte et al., 
2010 (2)).  
The nested CES production structure of each sector can be generalised as shown in the figure below. Firms use a 
capital and labour composite (VA) and an energy and non-energy composite of intermediate goods (M), where 
energy (EN) itself is composed of an oil, coal and gas composite and electricity sources. Electricity itself is produced 
from fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas), other intermediates, labour and capital inputs. We distinguish two non-energy 
sectors, an energy-intensive ((e.g. transport and mining sectors, I) and a non-energy intensive sector (S). Figure 1 
also shows the corresponding elasticities of substitutions between the production function composites. The 
calibrated values for these elasticities are shown in Table 1. These values are based on a combination of studies on 
energy-related CGE models (Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Sue Wing, 2003 (3)). The 
sectoral composition is calibrated on the GTAP 7 database, which is primarily based on 2004 data (4). The 2004 
price of oil was USD 40 per barrel; a 20% oil price increase in our simulation exercise corresponds to a USD 8 
increase.  
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(1) Ratto M., W. Roeger and J. in ’t Veld (2009), ‘QUEST III: An estimated open-economy DSGE model of the euro area with 
fiscal and monetary policy’, Economic Modelling, Vol. 26 (1), pp. 222-233. 
(2) Conte, A., A. Labat, J. Varga and Ž. Žarnić (2010), ‘What is the growth potential of green innovation? An assessment of EU 
climate policy options’, European Economy Economic Papers, No 413. 
(3) Bovenberg, A. L. and L. H. Goulder (1996), ‘Optimal environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes: General 
equilibrium analyses’, American Economic Review, Vol. 86 (4), pp. 985-1000. Goulder, L. H. and S. H. Schneider (1999), 
‘Induced technological change and the attractiveness of CO2 abatement policies’, Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 21 
(3-4), pp. 211-253. Sue Wing, I. (2003), ‘Induced technical change and the cost of climate policy’, MIT Global Science and 
Policy Change Report, No 102. 
(4) The share of net oil imports is calibrated at 2.26 % of GDP for the EU-27. We also account for the quantity taxes/excise duties 
on fuel, which amounts to 1.4 % of EU GDP on the baseline (DG TAXUD, 2010). 
  
 
(Continued on the next page)
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Calibration of sectoral elasticities 
Sector Elasticity Elasticity of substitution between 
Energy-intensive Non-energy intensive Energy sectors Final consumption 
σvam,n Value added and intermediates 0.5 0.5 0.5 - 
σn,NEN-EN Non-energy and energy 
products/services 
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
σn,NEN Non-energy products/services 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
σn,EN Energy products/services 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
σn,FOSSIL Fossil fuel products/services 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
σn,DIM Domestic and imported 
products/services 
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
σn,F Imported goods 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
  
 
 
 
Graph 5.1: Oil price developments  
(July 2001 to July 2011) 
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Impact on economic activity 
Oil price shocks affect the economy through 
supply and demand channels. As terms-of-trade 
shocks they have an impact on the economy 
through their effect on production decisions and 
relative prices. Oil price shocks represent a shift 
in purchasing power between oil-exporting 
countries and oil-importing countries. As demand 
for energy is relatively inelastic, an increase in 
energy prices leads to a loss in real income 
(wealth transfer) and so affects consumers’ and 
firms’ spending on goods and services other than 
energy. The demand effects through this income 
channel are important to explain the major impact 
of oil price changes on the economy. Supply-side 
effects arise from the use of oil as an input factor 
in the production process. With limited short-term 
substitution possibilities, an increase in the price 
of oil inputs increases production costs and affects 
prices and output.  
 
 
Disentangling demand and supply shocks in oil 
markets 
It is impossible to predict the macroeconomic 
implications of higher oil prices without knowing 
the underlying causes. Assuming exogeneity, i.e. 
allowing for the price of oil to change while 
keeping everything else constant, is not a valid 
assumption for two main reasons. First, there is 
the issue of reverse causality. Macroeconomic 
aggregates also affect oil prices and hence cause 
and effects are not well defined when relating 
changes in the price of oil to macroeconomic 
outcomes. (26) Second, the price of oil can be 
driven by supply or demand shocks in the market 
for crude oil. These shocks have different 
dynamic effects on future oil prices and different 
macroeconomic impacts.  
Kilian (2009) employs a structural VAR model 
and distinguishes three types of shocks: crude oil 
supply shocks, defined as unpredictable 
innovations to global oil production; shocks to the 
global demand for industrial commodities, 
defined as innovations to global real activity; and 
oil-specific demand shocks, reflecting fluctuations 
in precautionary demand for oil driven by 
uncertainties about future oil supply shortfalls. He 
finds that an increase in precautionary demand for 
oil causes an immediate, persistent and large 
increase in the real price of oil; global demand 
shocks for all commodities cause delayed, but 
sustained price increases; while crude oil 
                                                        
(26) Barsky, R. and L. Kilian (2004), ‘Oil and the macroeconomy 
since the 1970s’, Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 
18(4), pp. 115-34. 
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production disruptions typically cause small and 
transitory increases in the short run. (27) 
Historical decompositions of oil price fluctuations 
show that oil price shocks have generally been 
driven by combinations of global aggregate 
demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks 
associated with market concerns about the 
availability of future oil supplies. Direct oil 
supply shocks have generally played a smaller 
role. However, there are now widespread 
concerns about future oil supplies and about a 
general downshift in the trend growth of oil 
supply due to rising scarcity in oil resources (peak 
oil). 
Model simulations  
We employ a sector-disaggregated version of the 
Commission’s QUEST model to analyse the 
different impacts of oil price shocks depending on 
whether they are caused by demand or supply 
factors. The model includes high and low energy-
intensive sectors and different energy production 
sectors (see Box 5.1 for details). (28) The model 
captures both supply and demand channels as 
energy serves as an input in the production 
process and is consumed directly by households. 
Graph 5.2: Temporary oil production shock: 
impact on EU GDP, oil use and oil prices (in%) 
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Source: QUEST simulations. 
 
The first scenario shows the impact of a severe 
disruption in oil production of 5 % that lasts for a 
four-year period, after which oil production is 
gradually restored again (Graph 5.2). This shock 
leads to an increase in the price of oil of around 
                                                        
(27) Kilian, L. (2009), ‘Not all oil price shocks are alike: 
Disentangling demand and supply shocks in the crude oil 
market’, American Economic Review Vol. 99(3), pp. 1053-
69. 
(28) The model simulations do not account for possible changes in 
'autonomous' (i.e. technology-driven) energy efficiency, but 
does capture substitution effects due to higher oil prices. 
20 % for the duration of the supply disruption, 
after which the oil price gradually returns to base 
again. (29) This supply shock has negative 
implications for growth in the EU. Output falls by 
0.15 % and consumption by 0.27 % in the first 
year relative to the baseline. Total oil use of the 
EU economy drops by 0.5-1.3 % in the first four 
years.  
 
Table 5.1: Impact of oil supply shock (in %) 
Years 1 2 3 4 5
GDP EU -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4
Total.oil.use -0.5 -0.9 -1.2 -1.3 -1.1
Price oil 22.1 21.8 22.5 22.5 10.9
Output energy int. sector -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -1.2 -1.0
Output non-int. sector -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6
Employment -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Consumption -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
GDP RoW -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5
Source: QUEST simulations. 
 
 
Graph 5.3: Oil demand shock: impact on EU 
GDP, oil use and oil prices (in%) 
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Source: QUEST simulations. 
The second scenario shown in Graph 5.3 
describes the impact of a demand-driven oil price 
shock, in which higher consumption demand in 
emerging markets boosts global economic 
activity. In this case, rising oil prices are due to 
higher global demand for oil. Rising oil prices are 
a drag on growth but this effect is relatively minor 
in relation to the positive impact of higher global 
demand. The EU even experiences a small 
positive GDP effect for the first 10 years of the 
simulation as the stimulus from higher global 
demand to exports initially outweighs the negative 
impact from higher energy prices. In the long term 
                                                        
(29) The calibration of this disaggregated version of the model is 
based on the EU social accounting matrix for 2004, the most 
recent year for which detailed sectoral data are available. As 
oil prices averaged around USD 40 per barrel in 2004, a 20 % 
increase in the price corresponds to USD 8 per barrel. 
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the latter effect comes to dominate and the output 
effect turns negative.  
 
 
Table 5.2: Impact of oil demand shock (in %) 
Years 1 2 3 4
GDP EU 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7
Total.oil.use -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Price oil 7.6 15.1 19.0 20.5 21.0
Output energy int. sector -0.8 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 0.0
Output non-int. sector 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Employment -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5
Consumption 3.6 3.0 2.5 2.2 2.0
GDP RoW 5.7 7.9 9.2 10.1 10.8
5
Source: QUEST simulations. 
 
These two scenarios illustrate the different effects 
demand- and supply-driven shocks can have on 
economic activity. Both shocks lead to a similar 
increase in the price of oil, but this is more 
gradual in the case of the demand-driven shock. 
As shown in Table 5.1, for a supply shock, an 
increase in the price of oil hits particularly 
strongly the energy-intensive sector and leads to 
an economy-wide fall in employment. Total oil 
use declines as costs increase, but the decline is 
much smaller in the demand-driven oil price 
shock, as higher economic activity leads to more 
energy use. In the oil demand shock, output in the 
energy-intensive sector declines on impact, but 
recovers in later years as global demand increases 
(Table 5.2). In the oil supply shock, there are 
spillovers to the non-energy intensive sector and 
output in this sector declines as well, while in the 
oil demand shock output in the non-energy 
intensive sector  increases as global growth rises.  
Summing up, these two scenarios show the impact 
of oil price changes depends crucially on the 
underlying causes. While supply-driven oil price 
shocks have a significant negative impact on 
economic activity, the overall impact from 
demand driven shocks could still be positive. Of 
course, in real time it is always difficult to 
disentangle the causes of changes in the price of 
crude oil. At present, a combination of factors, i.e. 
supply disruptions as well as higher world 
demand for oil, are most likely playing a role, 
suggesting that the overall impact of recent rises 
in oil prices on growth should remain limited. 
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